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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Consumer Online Search and Digital Content Consumption
by
Shuo Zhang
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
Professor Tat Y. Chan, Co-Chair
Associate Professor George-Levi Gayle, Co-Chair
In my dissertation, I apply empirical quantitative methods to marketing research and investigate
consumer online search and purchase patterns, as well as digital consumption behaviors and the
potential implication for marketing managers. This dissertation consists of two chapters. Chapter
1 studies the consumer shopping channel choice when they search and shop for products online.
Mobile phones have emerged as a major channel for online shopping as an alternative to PCs.
Despite more consumers using mobile phones, the conversion rate on the mobile channel is lower
than that on the PC channel. In this study, we propose a structural consumer search-and-purchase
model that endogenizes the channel choice to explain the observed data pattern. Results suggest
starting a search session using mobile phones is less costly, but intensive search is costlier.
Consequently, mobile phones attract consumers who tend to have lower overall purchase interests
and will search less. Based on the results, we use counterfactuals to explore how online retailers
can customize their marketing strategies for consumers on the two channels. We find the optimal
price on mobile is 2.7% lower than on PC. When sellers retarget non-purchasers by offering
channel-specific coupons, the optimal coupon value is 6% higher for consumers on mobile than
on PC. Sellers’ profit increase will be 5.1% higher when the retargeting coupons are channel
specific.
viii

Chapter 2 examines consumers’ time-inconsistent preferences in digital content consumption and
their strategic self-control behaviors. We use a unique dataset obtained from a major digital book
platform in China, where consumers can pay either by chapters or by monthly subscription. Onethird of consumers consistently choose to pay by chapters, even though monthly subscription
would significantly reduce the monetary cost. We propose a dynamic structural model that
incorporates time-inconsistent preferences and strategic self-control behaviors to rationalize
overpaying behavior. We first analytically demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium, and
show how, under steady states, overpaying for reading may be optimal for consumers. We then
estimate the model from the data. Results show that there is a large segment of consumers who are
highly price-sensitive. They are also willing to overpay to curb future consumption. Our
counterfactuals show that eliminating the pay-per-chapter plan would hurt consumer welfare and
the platform’s profit. Eliminating the monthly subscription plan, however, would increase the
platform’s profit but reduce consumer welfare. We introduce a novel nonlinear pricing plan with
volume surcharge and illustrate how it can simultaneously improve the platform’s profit and
consumer welfare.

ix

Chapter 1
Online Shopping with Endogenous PC and
Mobile Channel Choice
Co-authored with Zhengling Jiang and Hai Che

1.1 Introduction
In recent years, the online retail industry has seen a rapid increase in traffic from mobile devices
compared to traditional PCs, including desktops and laptops. In the US, the average time adults
spend using mobile devices to shop has surpassed that using PC since 2015. 1 Knowing the
popularity of online shopping by smartphones, most major US retailers have been aggressively
increasing their investment in both mobile application development and advertisement.2
Despite the more intensive usage of smartphones, consumers make fewer purchases from
mobile devices than from PCs. A report from Business Insider Intelligence shows that although
almost 60% of the time is allocated to the mobile device, only 15% of the total sales are generated
from this channel.3 Such disproportionally low sales on mobile is consistent with the conversionrate gap between the two channels. Based on data collected from over 1.9 billion shopping sessions
in the US from 2015 Q4 to 2016 Q4, the conversion rate on PC is consistently much higher than

1

Source:https://www.businessinsider.com/the-mobile-checkout-report-how-retailers-and-tech-giants-are-pushingconsumers-12-2015.
2
Source:https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2018/02/23/mobile-advertising-will-drive-75-of-all-digital-adspend-in-2018-heres-whats-changing/#69b95ed758be.
3
Source:https://www.businessinsider.com/the-mobile-checkout-report-how-retailers-and-tech-giants-are-pushingconsumers-12-2015.

1

that on mobile (e.g., the average conversion rate is 4.14% on PC and 1.55% on mobile in 2016
Q4).4
The systematic differences in browsing and purchase behaviors between PC and mobile
channels offer online retailers an opportunity to differentiate and target consumers on the two
channels. Traditional multi-channel retailers with online and offline channels have been engaging
in channel-based price differentiation (Wolk and Ebling 2010, Cavallo 2017). With the emerging
mobile channel, some companies have offered lower prices for mobile users. For example,
anecdotal evidence shows Kayak and Orbitz quote lower hotel prices for mobile users than for PC
users.5 Other companies do the opposite. Hannak et al. (2014) document that Home Depot provides
more expensive products for mobile users than for desktop users. Many other companies do not
engage in differential product offerings on the two channels. Clearly, what pricing strategy is more
profitable depends on how consumers on the two channels differ from each other.
This paper has two main objectives. The first is to study how and, more importantly, why
consumer search and purchase behaviors on PC and mobile channels differ. To achieve this goal,
we develop a structural consumer search model with endogenous channel choice. The proposed
model can explain how different types of consumers choose the shopping channel depending on
the benefits and costs of using each channel. By modeling the consumer’s channel choice, our
model rationalizes the intriguing data pattern of a higher usage rate but a significantly lower
conversion rate on mobile. Estimation results from our model can help firms predict which
segments of consumers would shop on mobile and PC channels, which enables us to achieve the

4

Souce:https://www.smartinsights.com/mobile-marketing/mobile-commerce/mobile-users-still-not-converting/.
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/10/22/online-shopping-yields-different-prices-results-saysnortheastern-study/ZbSVnoBxPJtA8STeWbpQ9H/story.html
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2

second objective of the paper, which is to design channel-specific marketing strategies targeting
consumers on the two channels. Without the structural model, whether and how prices should
differ on the two channels is not ex-ante clear.
We estimate the proposed model using a unique clickstream dataset from both PC and
mobile channels from Taobao, the largest online shopping platform in China. Consumers can use
PCs or smartphones to browse and make purchases. The data set contains information on which
channel consumers use to browse and purchase. We observe each consumer’s search activities
(through browsing different product options) and purchase decisions. We also collect some
additional information, such as consumer demographics and their smartphone attributes that may
influence consumer channel choice.
Based on the data, we find (1) a higher proportion of consumer usage, (2) a smaller number
of searches per customer, and (3) a lower conversion rate for the mobile channel than for the PC
channel, consistent with the industry reports of the US market.6 Even after controlling for the
difference in the number of searches on the two channels, the gap in the conversion rate remains
unchanged. Estimation results show that, on average, the marginal search cost for an additional
search is ¥1.55 (or US$0.23) higher on mobile than on PC. The average initial fixed search cost
for starting a search session, however, is ¥1.66 (or US$0.25) higher on PC than on mobile. How
does this difference influence consumers’ channel choice and conversion rate on each channel?
When deciding which channel to shop, consumers consider the search-cost differences and choose
the channel that maximizes the expected utility after search. Given the lower marginal search cost
on PC, consumers who want to conduct more extensive search are more likely to choose PC over

6

Souce:https://www.smartinsights.com/mobile-marketing/mobile-commerce/mobile-users-still-not-converting/.
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mobile. Because consumers with higher overall valuation are willing to search more, they are more
likely to self-select into using the PC channel. Consumers with a lower valuation of the category
are more likely to conduct fewer searches and choose the mobile channel due to a lower initial
fixed cost. This mechanism of consumer self-selection in our model therefore explains the
observed conversion-rate gap between the two channels. We present evidence in the paper that
several other alternative explanations, including the difference in transaction costs, cannot explain
this difference.
The estimation results also show the heterogeneity in search costs and channel choices
across different types of consumers. For example, consumers with more prior purchases and a
longer registration history on the platform are associated with a lower fixed search cost on PCs,
likely because these consumers were more accustomed to shopping from PCs before the mobile
phones became popular. In terms of demographics, younger consumers and women are more likely
to choose the mobile channel. Different types of smartphones influence the marginal search cost
on mobile. We find that smartphones with a higher screen resolution (typically associated with a
larger screen size) and better operating systems are associated with a lower marginal search cost,
which increases the likelihood of using the mobile channel.
To guide how sellers can better target consumers on the two channels, we conduct
counterfactual analyses. We first investigate the optimal strategy if sellers set different prices on
PC versus mobile channels. Optimal prices can be different because consumers drawn to shopping
on the two channels are systematically different. Our proposed model accounts for both channel
choice and search activity. We find the optimal price on mobile is 2.7% lower than on PC, because
consumers on the PC channel tend to have higher overall valuation due to the self-selection in
channel choice. Next, we investigate the retargeting strategy by providing a coupon for consumers
4

who browsed but did not purchase. When sellers utilize the information of consumer channel
choice, results suggest the optimal coupon value is about 6% higher for consumers on mobile than
on PC. Although this analysis focuses on non-purchasers, the result is consistent with a lower
optimal price on mobile suggested by the first counterfactual. Overall, sellers’ profit increase is
5.1% higher when the retargeting strategy is channel specific than when it does not differentiate
channels. The counterfactual results illustrate the importance of considering consumers’ channel
choice when planning marketing activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related literature in section 1.2
and present the data in section 1.3. We develop the model in section 1.4, followed by the estimation
strategy and model identification in section 1.5. The estimation results are discussed in section 1.6.
Section 1.7 presents the counterfactual regarding optimal channel-specific pricing and retargeting
strategies. We conclude the paper and suggest future research in section 1.8.

1.2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to the multi-channel retailing literature. It has always been of interest for
marketers to understand how to manage customers in a multi-channel environment. In the existing
literature, researchers are primarily concerned about issues related to online shopping websites,
physical stores, and catalogs (e.g., Neslin et al. 2006, Verhoef et al. 2007, Ansari et al. 2008, Neslin
and Shankar 2009, Venkatesan et al. 2007, Wang and Goldfarb 2017, Forman et al. 2009). One of
the questions of interest in this line of research is to understand the behavioral difference for
consumers who use different channels. Hitt and Frei (2002) document the difference in consumer
characteristics and behavior with PC and traditional banking. Degeratu et al. (2000) find that online
and physical store environments can affect consumer choices in different ways. Our paper
investigates the difference in behavioral patterns (e.g., the intensity of search, conversion rate, etc.)
5

for consumers who use smartphones or PCs to shop, which is a relatively new and increasingly
important multi-channel context. Different from de Hann et al. (2018), who focus on the
conversion rate for consumers who switch devices between mobile and PC, we explain the
conversion-rate difference for consumers who choose either channel. By treating channel as an
endogenous choice in our model, we can not only explain the observed behavioral difference on
mobile and PC channels, but can also provide guidance on how sellers can offer channel-specific
pricing and promotional strategies to increase profit.
This paper is also related to the growing literature about consumers using mobile devices.
Existing research has studied how consumers respond to firms’ mobile marketing activities
(Shankar and Balasubramanian 2009, Andrews et al. 2016), the impact of the mobile channel on
consumer purchase (Einav et al. 2014, Wang et al. 2015, Xu et al. 2016) and news consumption
(Xu et al. 2014), content generation and usage (Ghose and Han, 2011), and consumer search
behaviors (Daurer et al. 2016). Using data from eBay, Einav et al. (2014) document that the mobile
channel is more often used for strictly browsing, leading to a lower conversion rate than on PC.
They also find the mobile channel is more often used for common products instead of idiosyncratic
items that require more careful inspection. Ghose et al. (2012) find the search cost is higher on
mobile than on PC, although local activities (distance) matter more. They do not explicitly model
how consumers choose between the two channels. Different from the existing literature on the
mobile channel, our paper studies the consumer channel choice using a structural model.
Furthermore, our paper documents how channel choice differs across consumers with different
demographics, purchase history, and mobile-device attributes.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature of consumer search. Because information
gathering is costly (i.e., requiring time and effort), consumers cannot review all possible options
6

when making a purchase. Recent empirical studies have estimated consumer search models to
describe how consumers make search and purchase decisions (e.g., Kim et al. 2010, Koulayev
2014, Honka 2014, Chen and Yao 2016, Kim et al. 2016, Honka and Chintagunta 2016).
Understanding consumer search is important for firms when making marketing decisions, such as
pricing (e.g., Hong and Shum 2006, Wildenbeest 2011, Zhang et al. 2018). Most of the existing
literature considers consumer search behavior on one channel, which is likely driven by the
availability of browsing data only from one channel (e.g., Chen and Yao [2016] and Ursu [2018]
study consumer search behaviors using online browsing data). Honka (2014) considers different
channels by allowing the search cost to differ when obtaining an insurance quote through the
insurer website, online quote service, or call center. In this paper, we obtain consumers’ browsing
and purchase data as well as which channel, PC or mobile, consumers use. Our search model
endogenizes consumers’ channel choice, which allows us to study the optimal channel-specific
pricing and promotional strategies. A recent working paper by Jiang et al. (2019) uses a consumer
search model to explore the effectiveness of retargeting strategies. We also study how to improve
the effectiveness of retargeting strategies in one of the counterfactuals; however, our focus is on
channel-specific strategies.

1.3 Data
Our dataset comes from Taobao, which is the largest online shopping platform in China and is
owned by Alibaba. Taobao has both mobile and PC channels for consumers to browse and make
purchases. The product offerings and their attributes, including prices, are the same on the two
channels. From the dataset, we observe detailed individual-level browsing history and purchase
decisions and, more importantly, through which channel, mobile or PC, a browsing activity
happens. The dataset also contains additional consumer characteristics including demographic
7

information, smartphone attributes (even for those who did not use the mobile channel to make
purchases in our data), and prior shopping history on the platform. We collect data for consumers
who had browsed the fishing pole category. We observe search and purchases of 133,896 unique
consumers during the data-observation period from October 15, 2014, to November 15, 2014.
Among those consumers, 51% had browsed at least one product option from the mobile channel
and 49% from the PC channel. Moreover, only 6% of them had used both PC and mobile channels
during the one-month data-observation period. Most purchasers (99.2%) bought only one product
during the sample period. Thus, we assume consumers have a unit demand in the model.
The data show the browsing and purchase patterns are very different on mobile versus PC.
First, the conversion rate, defined as the percentage of consumers who made a purchase out of
those who browsed, is significantly lower on mobile (9.93%) than on PC (13.59%). Second, the
search intensity, defined as the number of unique products browsed, is higher on PC than on
mobile: 58% of consumers browse one product on PC, compared to 65% on mobile, and 28% of
consumers browse at least three products on PC, compared to 20% on mobile. Figure 1.1
graphically compares the proportion of consumers shopping on the two channels conditional on
the number of searches. More consumers choose the mobile channel if they only search one option;
however, for those who search three options or more, the proportion who shop via PC is
significantly larger.

8
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Figure 1.1 Proportion of Consumers on Each Channel by Number of Products Searched

Table 1.1 reports the average and the standard deviation of prices and number of searched
options. We observe consumer demographics, gender and age, for 65% of the sample. We also
collect consumers’ smartphone-device information including the model, screen size, and the
phone’s operating system, for 82% of the sample. The rest of Table 1.1 reports the variable
descriptions and summary statistics for consumer demographics and mobile-device characteristics.
Table 1.1 Variable Description and Summary Statistics

Variable

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Price

Unit price for fishing poles

263.7

63.69

Search times

Number of products browsed by consumers

1.89

1.27

Buyer rating

Based on buyer’s prior purchase history

3.8

1.96

0.005

–

183.2

575.81

Buyer rating missing Indicator variable; equals 1 if buyer rating is
missing
Buyer spending

Buyer total spending in ¥ before data
observation period

9

Buyer history
Screen resolution
(length)

Number of days passed since the buyer
registered on the website

1099

831.47

Smartphone screen resolution in pixels (width)

1184

392.86

782.3

299.42

Screen resolution
(width)

Smartphone screen resolution in pixels (height)

IOS

Indicator variable; equals 1 for IOS operating
system

0.34

–

Android

Indicator variable; equals 1 for Android
operating system

0.15

–

Mobile browsing

Total number of products browsed on a
smartphone before data observation period

173.9

295.90

Male

Indicator variable; equals 1 for male

0.56

–

Age

Buyer’s age

30. 6

8.47

Male missing

Indictor variable; equals 1 if gender
information is missing

0.09

–

Age missing

Indictor variable; equals 1 if age information is
missing

0.13

–

Mobile missing

Indicator variable; equals 1 if there is no
smartphone information

0.34

–

1.3.1 Channel Choice
The prices for fishing poles did not change over time during our sample observation period. Other
product attributes are also identical on mobile and PC, and thus do not affect the channel choice.
Consumer characteristics, on the other hand, may affect the choice. We use a reduced-form
regression to test how consumers who choose to use PC or mobile are systematically different.
Using channel choice as the dependent variable, which equals 1 if the consumer chooses PC, and
0 if he chooses mobile, we run a probit regression to study how the channel choice correlates with

10

various observed consumer characteristics (described in Table 1.1).7 Results are reported in Table
2.
Table 1.2 Channel Choice with Consumer Characteristics
Estimate

Std. Error

p-value

(Intercept)

-1.12

0.08

***

Buyer rating

0.12

4.06E-03

***

Buyer rating missing

-0.32

0.03

***

Buyer spending

8.38E-05

2.11E-05

***

Buyer history

7.89E-05

6.66E-06

***

Screen resolution

-1.12E-07

6.52E-09

***

IOS

-0.03

0.01

**

Android

-0.05

0.01

***

Mobile browsing

-2.03E-03

2.84E-05

***

Mobile missing

1.82E-03

1.22E-02

Male

0.40

0.08

***

Age

0.01

5.97E-04

***

Gender missing

-0.04

0.08

Age missing

0.23

0.08

Note:

**

*:p<0.1; **:p<0.05; ***:p<0.01

Considerable heterogeneity exists among consumers who choose PC or mobile. We find
that younger consumers and consumers who use mobile phones with higher screen resolution and

7

We multiply the screen resolution in pixels in length and width, and use the demeaned value to represent screen
resolution in the model estimation.
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more advanced operating systems 8 are more likely to use the mobile channel. In addition,
consumers with a higher buyer rating (based on a higher number of prior purchases) and higher
prior spending are more likely to use the PC channel, both of which positively correlate with the
consumer’s past experience on Taobao. These consumers are likely more familiar with the PC
channel than the mobile channel because Taobao only introduced the mobile channel in 2008.9
The reduced-form evidence suggests the observed consumer characteristics significantly correlate
with their channel choice. We incorporate these characteristics in the structural model to account
for consumer heterogeneity.

1.3.2 Potential Explanations for the Conversion-Rate Difference
The underlying mechanism driving the observed data pattern in our model is that consumers
endogenously choose which channel to browse. We identify and estimate both a marginal search
cost (for an addition search) as well as an initial fixed cost (for starting a search session) for the
two channels. The channel choice depends on the level of overall valuation as well as the cost to
search on the two channels. Before describing the full model, we discuss in this subsection several
possible explanations for the lower conversion rate on mobile compared to PC to help justify our
model setup. Note we assume consumers have a choice between using mobile or PC. The CNNIC
(the Chinese administrative agency responsible for Internet affairs) reports that among Internet
users, the smartphone penetration is 85.8%, and desktop and laptop penetrations are 70.8% and
43.2% during 2014.10 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that consumers have access to both
types of devices.

8

Apple and Android operating systems were considered advanced in China during 2014, when many other
smartphones used operating systems developed by local manufacturers.
9
Source: https://yq.aliyun.com/articles/583335.
10
Source: http://www.cac.gov.cn/files/pdf/hlwtjbg/hlwlfzzktjbg035.pdf.
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The first potential explanation is that the lower conversion rate on mobile is driven by a
higher marginal search cost. With a higher marginal search cost, consumers browse fewer options
and are less likely to find a good match and make a purchase on mobile. To test the hypothesis that
the difference in the marginal search costs is the only cause for the conversion-rate gap, we
compare the conversion rates for consumers who browsed the same number of products. Figure
1.2 shows the conversion rate on PC is still consistently higher than that on mobile among
consumers who browse the same number of products. Therefore, although the marginal searchcost difference between the two channels can lead to an overall conversion-rate gap, it cannot
explain the gap after controlling for the number of products browsed.

41.9%
40%
Conversion Rate

PC Mobile
30%

24.9%

20%
10%

15.7%14.3%

29.7%
24.7%

31.4%

17.9%

6.3% 5.8%

0%
1

2
3
4
Number of Products Searched

5

Figure 1.2 Conversion Rate with Number of Products Searched

The second potential explanation is the difference in transaction cost for completing a
purchase on mobile versus PC. For example, consumers may have difficulty typing in the shipping
address or the payment information when using a smartphone without a keyboard. In that case,
consumers might be more likely to abandon the shopping session on mobile without purchase. To
test this explanation, we focus on a small group of consumers (6%) who use both channels to
browse the products. If the transaction cost is higher on mobile, we would expect a higher
13

conversion rate on PC among these consumers as well. Figure 2.3 shows that among the consumers
who browse both channels, the conversion rates on the two channels are almost the same (12.9%
on PC, 12.2% on mobile). The interpretation for the equal conversion rates is that either the
transaction cost is the same on both channels or the transaction cost is trivial, so it does not play
an important role in determining where to purchase. In reality, once a debit or credit card is linked
to the account, consumers on Taobao only need to type in a six-digit password for payment using
mobile devices. Therefore, the time and effort required for payment on mobile is not distinctively
higher than that on PC.

Conversion Rate

15%

12.9%

12.2%

PC

Mobile

10%
5%
0%

Figure 1.3 Conversion Rate on Mobile and PC for Consumers Who Used Both Channels

1.4 Model
We propose a consumer search-and-purchase model that incorporates endogenous channel choice.
Before starting the search, consumers first choose through which channel (mobile or PC) to browse
the products. We assume consumers can only choose one channel, due to the empirical observation
that only 6% of consumers ever switch devices in our data. We exclude this small group of
consumers in our empirical analysis to keep the model tractable.
Conditional on the channel choice, consumers then decide how many product options to
search. In the literature, both simultaneous and sequential search models have been applied to
14

study consumer search behavior. We do not observe the order of search from data. This data
limitation makes estimating a sequential search very difficult. Prior empirical studies (e.g., De Los
Santos et al. 2012 and Honka 2013) have tested the two search models and found evidence to
support the simultaneous-search model. Therefore, we follow these studies by assuming
consumers conduct simultaneous search. We note that if the data on the search order are available,
our proposed framework of channel choice can be easily carried through to scenarios where
consumers search sequentially.
Finally, given the channel choice and the number of product options to search, consumers
will search on the retail platform. After the search, they will decide whether to purchase from the
searched options and, if they do, which option they should buy.

1.4.1 Consumer Utility and Search
We first describe consumers’ search and purchase decisions after they have selected a channel to
browse. Suppose there are 𝐼 consumers and 𝐽 products. The utility of product 𝑗 for consumer 𝑖 is
specified as
𝑢!" = 𝑎! − 𝜆 ∙ 𝑃" + 𝑒!",

(1)

where 𝑎! is consumer 𝑖 $ 𝑠 valuation for the product category. We allow 𝑎! to be heterogeneous
across consumers with a normal distribution 𝑎! ~𝑁(𝜇% , 𝜎%& ). 𝑃" is the price of product 𝑗 and 𝑒!" is
the individual match value. We assume 𝑒!" follows i.i.d. extreme-value type-I distribution across
consumers and products. If the consumer decides not to purchase any product after search, he
chooses the outside option denoted by 𝑒!' . The outside option 𝑒!' represents consumer 𝑖 $ 𝑠
valuation of purchasing from other websites or purchasing other products. We assume consumers
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know their own outside option before conducting the search activities. 𝑒!' is assumed to follow
i.i.d. extreme-value type-I distribution across consumers.
Denote channel choice as 𝑠! ∈ {1,0}, where 𝑠! = 1 if consumer 𝑖 chooses the PC channel,
and 𝑠! = 0 if choosing mobile. We first describe how consumers decide the number of product
options to search, conditional on choosing channel s. Before the search, consumer 𝑖 knows his
initial utility level 𝑎! . We assume the consumer knows the overall distribution of 𝑝" and 𝑒!" , but
he has no information on 𝑝" and 𝑒!" for a specific retailer 𝑗, which are only revealed if he clicks
into the product detail page. Therefore, the expected 𝑢!" conditional on purchase for all product
options are the same to the consumer before the search, but the overall expected utility from search
will be different due to individuals having different levels of 𝑎! and thus different purchase
probabilities. The justification of this assumption is that many small sellers are on Taobao, and
none of them belong to well-known branded manufacturers. Consumers are unlikely to have a
priori information on the quality of any specific seller. Furthermore, each seller sells multiple
brands and models of fishing poles; without searching for detailed information on the product
page, consumers are unlikely to know anything about the price or other product and service
attributes.
Under this assumption, our simultaneous search model focuses on how many product
options the consumer chooses to search, denoted by 𝑏! . Consumer 𝑖 incurs a marginal search cost
𝑐!( for each product he browses. We allow the marginal search cost to vary across the two channels
and individuals. Furthermore, as is common in the search literature, our data do not include
consumers who do not search at all. Thus, we require that consumers search at least once in the
model. A consumer chooses 𝑏! to maximize the expected utility taking account of the search cost.
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Following Chade and Smith (2010), the consumer maximizes the following indirect utility by
choosing the number of searches:
𝐼𝑈! (𝑏) = 𝐸 AmaxE𝑢!" FG − 𝑏! ∙ 𝑐!( ,
"∈*!"

(2)

where 𝐶!+ is the set of the searched options (the outside option 𝑒!' is always an element in 𝐶!+ ).
The probability that consumer 𝑖 chooses to search 𝑏! times is
𝑃!+|-,( = 𝑃 {𝐼𝑈! (𝑏) ≥ 𝐼𝑈! (𝑏 $ )|𝑎! , 𝑠! }.

(3)

After the search, consumers make their purchase decisions by comparing the realized
utilities among the choice set (knowing the price and individual match value) and the outside
option. Consumer 𝑖′𝑠 conditional purchase probability for product 𝑘 is
𝑃!.|/,+,-,( = 𝑃E𝑢!. > 𝑢!. # , ∀𝑘 $ ∈ 𝐶!+ P𝑒!" , 𝑃" , 𝑎! , 𝑠! F.

(4)

In other words, the consumer will choose option 𝑘 if the realized utility is larger than any other
options 𝑘 $ in the choice set.
Note that various factors, including the ranking of product options (e.g., Ursu 2018), may
affect the final outcome. We do not observe those factors from data. The impact of these factors
on the purchase decision is captured by 𝑒!" , which is unknown to the consumer when he decides
the optimal 𝑏! . Conditional on 𝑏! , these factors may affect which product options the consumer
will search, as well as the order of the search. Our model is agnostic about what options are
searched and how they are searched. Importantly, these unobserved factors do not affect our main
focus on consumer channel choice.
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1.4.2 Consumer Channel Choice
Before starting the search process, consumers choose whether to use a smartphone or a PC to shop.
We introduce a fixed search cost in addition to the marginal search cost for both channels. Different
from the marginal search cost, which depends on how many products a consumer browses, the
fixed search cost is a one-time upfront cost to start a search session. The fixed cost can come from
the time and effort required to use a PC or a smartphone to initialize the search process, whereas
the marginal search cost is associated with the time and effort required to gather information from
the product page. Prior literature (Ghose et al. 2012) and the data pattern of a higher number of
searches on PCs suggests the marginal search cost on mobile should be higher than that on PCs,
likely because of the smaller screen and lack of keyboard on a smartphone. On the other hand, we
expect the PC channel to have a higher fixed cost than the mobile channel, because the portability
of a smartphone allows consumers to access it from anywhere.11
We allow individual heterogeneity in both the fixed and marginal search costs given the
consumer’s demographic information, mobile-device features, and past usage patterns. For
example, younger consumers may be more proficient in using their smartphones for online
shopping. In addition, smartphones with larger screen sizes or advanced operating systems could
make the search process more effortless and thus are associated with a lower marginal search cost.
Because consumers choose one of the channels to search, for model identification, the fixed cost
of the mobile channel is normalized to 0. We specify the fixed cost of the PC channel as
𝑓𝑐! = 𝜇01 + 𝛽𝑍! + 𝑣!01 ,

11

(5)

We assume consumers have access to both channels. If a consumer cannot access a channel (e.g., cannot use PC to
shop while in transit), the model interprets such cases as the consumers having a very high fixed search cost to start a
shopping session on PC.
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where 𝜇01 is a constant term, 𝑍! is a list of relevant consumer characteristics and device attributes,
and 𝜈!01 captures the unobservable heterogeneity and is assumed to follow a standard normal
distribution. We do not impose the fixed cost on PC to be higher or lower than that on mobile. The
estimated parameters determine the sign and magnitude of the fixed cost on PC for different
consumers.
Consumers pay a marginal search cost for an additional search. The marginal search cost
for consumer 𝑖 on the PC channel (𝑠! = 1) is
𝑐!2 = exp(𝜇1 + 𝜎1 𝑣!1 ),

(6)

where 𝑣!1 follows a standard normal distribution. The marginal search cost is guaranteed to be
positive in this specification (e.g., Hortaçsu and Syverson 2004).
The marginal search for consumer 𝑖 on the mobile channel (𝑠! = 0) can be systematically
different from his marginal search cost on PC. We specify the marginal search cost as
𝑐!' = 𝑐!2 + 𝑠𝑐' + 𝛾𝑋! ,

(7)

where 𝑠𝑐' represents the average difference in marginal search cost between mobile and PC, 𝑋! is
a list of consumer 𝑖 $ 𝑠 smartphone characteristics and his past mobile shopping experience that may
affect his marginal search cost on mobile, and 𝛾 captures the heterogeneity in marginal search cost
with observed characteristics 𝑋! . We do not impose the difference in marginal search cost between
mobile and PC, 𝑠𝑐' + 𝛾𝑋! , to be negative or positive. The estimated parameters determine the
marginal search cost for different consumers.
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We assume that before the search, consumer 𝑖 is aware of the distribution for prices and
individual match values. He knows his level of interest in the product category 𝑎! and his outside
option 𝑒!' . He also knows his marginal and fixed search costs for both channels. Based on the
information, the consumer forms expectations on the utility for each channel. Let 𝐹!+( be the
cumulative distribution function of the expected maximum utility among 𝑏 products searched by
consumer 𝑖 on channel 𝑠, and 𝑓!+( is the corresponding pdf function. The calculation of 𝐹!+( is
shown in detail in the next section. The consumer’s expected utility for channel
34

𝐸𝐶𝑈!( = max[𝐹!+( (𝑒!' ) ∙ 𝑒!' + ∫/
+

!$

is

𝑓!+( (𝑢)𝑢𝑑𝑢 − 𝑓𝑐! ∙ 𝑠! − 𝑏! ∙ 𝑐!( ].

(8)

When the maximum utility from the 𝑏 browsed products is lower than the outside option, the
consumer chooses the outside option. Otherwise, he will choose the maximum of the searched
options. The consumer chooses the channel that offers a higher expected utility. The channel
choice probability thus is
#

𝑃!(|- = 𝑃_𝐸𝐶𝑈!( ≥ 𝐸𝐶𝑈!( P𝑎! `, 𝑠 $ ∈ {0,1}.

(9)

To summarize, the channel choice depends on their overall valuation, outside option value,
and the fixed and marginal search costs on the two channels. The proposed model is able to capture
the difference in channel choices among consumers with different observed characteristics by
incorporating heterogeneous fixed and marginal search costs. Moreover, it provides a mechanism
of how consumers with different product valuation and search costs tend to select certain channel.
This endogenous channel choice is key to understanding the observed conversion rate and search
patterns between the two channels.
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1.5 Model Estimation and Identification
In this section, we lay out detailed model-estimation procedures, present results from a Monte
Carlo simulation study, and discuss the model identification.

1.5.1 Estimation Procedure
The likelihood function comprises the three parts of consumer decisions: choosing a
channel (channel choice probability 𝑃!,(|- ), searching 𝑏 product options (optimal search-time
probability, 𝑃!,+|-,( ), and purchase decisions (purchase probability 𝑃!.|/,+,-,( ). The likelihood
function integrates over the distribution of the outside option 𝑒!' , the individual shock for fixed
search cost 𝜈!01 and marginal search cost 𝑣!1 , and the valuation of the product category 𝑎! :
!

"
𝐿𝐿 = ∑8!62 logf∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∏2(6' ∏7
+62 ∏.6!% 𝑃!.|/,+,-,( 𝑃!,+|-,( 𝑃!(|- 𝑑𝐹(𝑒)𝑑𝐹_𝜈01 `𝑑𝐻(𝜈1 )𝑑𝐺(𝛼)k.

(10)
The probability functions in the equation do not have a closed-form solution. We use
simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the model by drawing from the corresponding
distributions for numerical integration. More specifically, we draw the following variables 𝑄
9
times. Consumer 𝑖 $ 𝑠 match value for product 𝑗 𝑒!"9 and the outside option 𝑒!'
are drawn

independently from extreme-value type-I distribution. The error terms for fixed search cost and
9
9
marginal search cost, 𝜈!1
and 𝜈!01
, are drawn i.i.d. from a standard normal distribution.
9
9
Consumers’ utility constant term is parameterized as 𝑎! = 𝜇% + 𝜎% ∙ 𝑒!, where 𝑒!is drawn from

a standard normal distribution.
We assume consumers know the distribution of prices prior to search, but the actual values
are only realized after they browse the product detail pages and pay the corresponding search cost.
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Before the main model estimation, we first estimate the price distribution, which determines the
benefit from an additional price search. Following prior literature on price-search models (e.g.,
Hong and Shum 2006, Moraga-González and Wildenbeest 2008, Honka 2014), we assume prices
follow an extreme-value type-I distribution and estimate the price-distribution parameters. We use
the estimated price-distribution parameters in the model estimation.
Consumers form expectations of the benefit they receive under a specific number of
searches. We evaluate the distribution of the benefit consumers receive from drawing the price and
individual match value 𝑏 times. To calculate the distribution of the expected benefit from search
given one set of parameters, we draw from the price and individual match-value distributions b
times, and calculate the expected maximum value as 𝑉+ = max{−𝜆𝑝2 + 𝑒2 , … , −𝜆𝑝+ + 𝑒+ }. The
process is repeated Q times. We get a 𝑄-length vector of 𝑉+ for 𝑏 number of searches, which
represents the distribution of the expected benefit from searching 𝑏 times.
To calculate channel choice probability (equation 8), we evaluate the expected utility from
choosing channel 𝑠 (equation 7). For consumer 𝑖, the expected utility from searching 𝑏! times on
channel 𝑠! is
( ]
q!( = max[𝑢!+
𝐸𝐶𝑈
− 𝑓𝑐! ∙ 𝑠! ,
+

(11)

(
where 𝑢!+
is the maximum utility from the searched products and the outside option minus the
(
corresponding marginal search cost. To calculate 𝑢!+
through simulation, we draw 𝑄 times from

the distributions for overall product valuation, outside option, and marginal search cost. We
(
calculate the utility with each set of random draws, and 𝑢!+
is evaluated as the average from the 𝑄

values:
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(
𝑢!+
=

1
9
9
9
rEs𝐼_𝑎!9 + 𝑉+9 > 𝑒!'
` ∙ _𝑎!9 + 𝑉+9 ` + 𝐼_𝑎!9 + 𝑉+9 < 𝑒!'
` ∙ 𝑒!'
u − 𝑏! ∙ 𝑐!(,9 F.
𝑄
9

We draw the fixed-search-cost random-error term 𝑄 times to calculate 𝑓𝑐! as specified in equation
(
q!( is the maximum of 𝑢!+
5. The expected utility for channel 𝑠 𝐸𝐶𝑈
by selecting the optimal number

of searches 𝑏! minus the corresponding fixed search cost.
q! ( , 𝑠 ∈ (0,1).
Consumers choose the channel that gives them higher expected utility 𝐸𝐶𝑈
The channel-choice probability calculated from the simulations is not a smooth function.
Following prior literature (McFadden 1989, Honka 2014), we apply a kernel-smoothing method
where the choice probability is represented by a scaled multivariate logistic CDF. The probability
of consumer i choosing channel 𝑠! is

𝑃!( =

1

,
q!( − 𝐸𝐶𝑈
q!2:( `k
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 f−𝜔2 ∙ _𝐸𝐶𝑈

where ω2 is a scaling parameter.
Next, we evaluate the probability of searching 𝑏! times. Consumers choose the number of
searches by maximizing the expected utility (equation 3). Applying the kernel-smoothing method,
the probability of consumer i choosing to search 𝑏! times conditional on choosing channel 𝑠! is

𝑃!+|( =

1
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜔& ∙ _𝐼𝑈!,+ − max_𝐼𝑈!,:+ ``

,

where ω& is a scaling parameter, and -b denotes search times other than 𝑏.
Finally, we evaluate the purchase probability for consumers after they have chosen a
channel and have selected the number of products to browse. The prices and individual match
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values are realized for options in the consumers’ consideration set 𝐶!+ (the 𝑏! products consumer
𝑖 browses). The probability that consumer 𝑖 chooses option 𝑘 from the consideration set 𝐶!+ on
channel 𝑠! is

𝑃!.|*!" ( =

1
,
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜔; ∙ (𝑢!. − max(𝑢!. # ))

where 𝑘 $ denotes choices other than option 𝑘, including the outside option 𝑘 = 0 when consumers
do not make a purchase, and ω; is a scaling parameter.
Combining the three sets of probabilities together, we obtain the overall probability of
observing consumer i choosing channel 𝑠! , searching 𝑏! times, and choosing option 𝑘. We evaluate
this probability through simulation by drawing the error terms for overall product valuation 𝛼! ,
fixed and marginal search costs 𝜈!01 , 𝜈!1 , individual match value for each product searched 𝑒!" , and
outside option 𝑒!' 𝑄 times. The overall likelihood considers channel-choice probability 𝑃!(9 ,
9
9
number-of-searches probability 𝑃!+|(
, and purchase probability 𝑃!.|*
:
!" (

2

9
9
𝑝!" = < ∑9 𝑃!(9 𝑃!+|(
𝑃!.|*
.
!" (

(12)

1.5.2 Identification
We discuss the identification of the model parameters. The parameters can be divided into three
categories: the marginal search-cost parameters {𝜇1 , 𝜎1 , 𝑠𝑐' , 𝛾}, the fixed search-cost parameters
{𝜇01 , 𝛽}, and the utility parameters {𝜇% , 𝜎% , 𝜆}.
For the marginal search-cost parameters, we identify the constant term and the standard
deviation of the error terms from the distribution of search times on both PC and mobile channels.
𝑠𝑐' captures the average difference in marginal search cost on PC and mobile. It is identified from
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the difference in the mean of the number of searches for consumers on the PC and mobile channels.
The systematic difference in the number of searches for consumers with different mobile attributes
identifies the observed heterogeneity in marginal search cost across consumers on the mobile
channel.
The identification of the fixed search cost on the PC channel comes from consumers’
channel choice for browsing. Recall that the fixed search cost on the mobile channel is normalized
to 0. The constant in the fixed cost 𝜇01 is identified from the proportion of the consumers who
choose the PC channel, after accounting for the difference in marginal search cost. If the fixed cost
on the PC channel is higher, more consumers will choose the mobile channel. The systematic
difference in channel choice among consumers with different demographics, user behaviors, and
device features identifies the observed heterogeneity in fixed cost across consumers.
The mean of the product-category valuation 𝜇% is identified from the overall level of the
conversion rate after search, and price sensitivity 𝜆 is identified from the purchase data. The
variation of the overall product valuation among consumers, 𝜎% , leads to the systematic difference
in consumers who select a certain channel for browsing. Consumers with a higher level of overall
product valuation may systematically choose a channel given its search-cost structure. For
example, when the average fixed cost on PC is higher than on mobile and the marginal search cost
is lower, consumers with a high value of 𝑎! will be more likely to choose PC. In general, if 𝜎% is
greater, the average utility difference of consumers who use PC will be greater than for those who
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use mobile, which will lead to a larger difference in conversion rates across the two channels.
Thus, the value of 𝜎% is identified by the systematic conversion-rate gap observed in our data. 12
We run a Monte Carlo study to test the model identification. We simulate data for 10,000
consumers and set the maximum number of searches at 5. The simulation procedure is as follows.
We draw the error terms of marginal search cost 𝜈!1 and fixed search cost 𝜈!01 i.i.d. from a standard
normal distribution. The outside option 𝑒!' is drawn from extreme-value type-I distribution. The
expected channel utility and the optimal search times are calculated as in equations 7 and 8. With
the chosen channel 𝑠 and search times 𝑏, consumers sample 𝑏 products. After search, consumers
see 𝑏 prices (drawn i.i.d. from the price distribution) and the match values for each product 𝑒!"
(drawn i.i.d. from extreme-value type-I distribution). Consumer 𝑖 makes purchase decisions
depending on the realized utility.
In the estimation, we set all scaling factors (𝜔2 , 𝜔& , 𝜔; ) in the kernel-smoothing logit
functions to be 20. The number of simulations Q is 50. Results from the Monte Carlo study are
reported in Table 1.3. Column (1) shows the true value of the parameters, and columns (2) and (3)
show the estimated value and standard error. Thus, the proposed estimation procedure can
successfully recover the true parameters.

12

When 𝜎& = 0, the systematic conversion-rate gap between PC and mobile will no longer exist.
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Table 1.3 Results from Monte Carlo Simulation

Variable

Utility
parameters

True
Value

Estimated
Value

Standard
Error

(1)

(2)

(3)

𝜇- : Mean of valuation

-45.0

-43.47

0.770

𝜎- : Std. dev. of valuation

110.0

125.71

13.48

𝜆: Price coefficient

-1.5

-1.45

0.005

𝜇1 : Mean of marginal search
cost

4.0

4.09

0.006

𝜎1 : Std. dev. of marginal
search cost

0.4

0.42

0.01

10.0

9.34

0.372

0.3

0.27

0.007

Search-cost
parameters 𝑠𝑐' : Difference in marginal
search cost on PC from
mobile
𝜇01 : Fixed search cost on PC
(normalized to 0 on mobile)

1.6 Results
We apply and estimate the proposed model using the Taobao data. In this section, we report
and discuss the model-estimation results. In particular, we highlight how the model of channel
choice can explain the lower conversion rate on mobile compared to PC. We show the estimated
model can reproduce the conversion rates and the number of searches very well across both
channels.
The estimation results are shown in Table 1.4. The estimated parameters are presented in four
panels. Starting from the first panel, the price coefficient is negative at -5.16 for ¥1 (or -$0.77 for
US$1). We transform the utility parameters into dollar value by dividing the estimated parameters
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by the price coefficient. The mean valuation for the product category 𝜇% is ¥148 (or US$21.7) and
the standard deviation across consumers 𝜎% is ¥53 (or US$7.9).
Table 1.4 Estimation Results

Estimated
Value

Standard
Error

p-value13

𝜇- : Mean of valuation

763

10.55

***

𝜎- : Std. dev. of valuation

272

5.20

***

𝜆: Price coefficient

-5.16

0.01

***

𝜇1 : Mean of marginal search cost

5.09

1.35E-03

***

𝜎1 : Std. dev. of marginal search
cost

0.82

3.91E-04

***

𝑠𝑐' : Difference in marginal
search cost on PC from mobile

8.02

0.04

***

𝜇01 : Fixed search cost on PC
(normalized to 0 on mobile)

8.57

0.05

***

Buyer rating

-0.03

2.43E-03

***

Buyer rating missing

0.01

0.02

Buyer spending

-1.10E-04

1.94E-05

***

Buyer history

-9.47E-05

5.95E-05

*

-0.06

0.01

***

-7.85E-06

0.02

-0.02

6.46E-04

3.51E-05

0.02

-1.32E-02

4.87E-04

***

-1.95E-04

1.08E-04

*

-3.49E-05

1.44E-05

**

Variable
Utility
parameters

Search-cost
parameters

Fixed-cost
heterogeneity

Male
Gender missing
Age
Age missing

Screen resolution
Marginal-cost
heterogeneity IOS
(Mobile)
Android

13

*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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***

Mobile browsing

-3.61E-02

3.14E-03

Mobile missing

-9.57E-08

0.01

***

The second panel shows the search-cost parameter estimates. Note the marginal search cost
is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution. We calculate the mean marginal search cost for
using PCs as exp(5.09+0.822/2)=227.3. Divided by the price coefficient, the mean cost is ¥44.05
(or US$6.61). Using the same procedure, the mean marginal search cost for using mobiles is
¥45.60 (or US$6.84). Thus, the average marginal search cost is 3.5% (¥1.55 or US$0.23) higher
on mobile than on PC. The difference is statistically significant but not very large in magnitude.
The marginal search cost determines the number of searches. This result is consistent with the data
pattern showing the average number of searches on mobile is lower than on PC.
The fixed search cost on mobile is normalized to 0. Dividing the fixed search-cost parameter
by the price coefficient, the cost for using PCs is higher by ¥1.66 (or US$0.25). Compared to the
average difference in marginal search cost ¥1.55 ($0.23), the one-time fixed cost is higher (by
about 6.8%) than the difference in marginal search cost between the two channels. Therefore, an
average consumer who searches only one time would prefer using the mobile channel to PC
because of the lower fixed search cost. When the optimal search times increases, PC becomes
increasingly appealing to consumers because of its lower marginal search cost. The results are
consistent with the data pattern showing that a larger proportion of consumers who search less tend
to shop on mobile phones, whereas those who search more are more likely to choose PCs.
In addition to explaining the difference in the number of searches for consumers on the two
channels, the marginal and fixed search-cost difference contributes to the observed gap in
conversion rates between the two channels. When deciding which channel to search, consumers
consider the search-cost differences and choose the channel that maximizes the expected utility
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after search. For consumers with higher overall valuation for the product category, the probability
of making a purchase after search is high. Consumers who are likely to buy have a higher expected
number of searches, because one additional search can have a higher marginal benefit in terms of
a lower price and/or a higher individual match value. With a higher expected number of searches,
these consumers are more likely to choose the PC channel with a lower marginal search cost.
Therefore, PC is more likely to attract consumers with a higher overall valuation, who are expected
to have a higher number of searches. Such self-selection of consumers leads to a higher conversion
rate on the PC channel.
The third panel reports the observed heterogeneity of fixed search cost across consumers.
Because Taobao started with the website optimized for PC and only introduced the mobile
interface later, long-time consumers may have started shopping on Taobao before the introduction
of the mobile-shopping option, and therefore become used to the PC shopping channel. We include
measures that positively correlate with long-time usage history on the platform. Results support
our hypothesis. Consumers with a higher buyer rating, more purchases in the past, and a longer
buyer history on the platform are associated with a lower fixed search cost on the PC channel,
which leads to a higher likelihood of using the PC channel compared to other consumers. This
finding is also consistent with the probit regression results (Table 2).
In addition to length of usage history, consumer demographics may also play a role in
explaining the choice of PC or mobile. We find age is negatively correlated with the fixed search
cost for the PC channel. In other words, older consumers are more likely to have a lower fixed
search cost on PC and are therefore more likely to use the PC channel for shopping. Male
consumers have a lower fixed search cost for PC, which means they are more likely than women
to use the PC channel for shopping. These estimates are again consistent with the reduced form in
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Table 2.
In the fourth panel, we explore how the marginal search cost varies with different types of
mobile devices. Because the marginal search cost is influenced by the effort in gathering
information from an additional search, such a process should be less costly if gathering information
on some mobile devices is easier. For example, consumers may find shopping using smartphones
with a higher screen resolution (typically associated with a larger screen size) and a more robust
operating system is easier. We find the parameter estimates for screen resolution, IOS, and Android
operating systems are all negative and statistically significant. For smartphones with higher screen
resolution and better operating systems, the marginal search cost becomes lower on the mobile
channel. The results are consistent with reduced-form analysis showing that consumers with the
more advanced smartphones are more likely to choose the mobile channel. Our results suggest that
as the smartphone technology continues to improve, the marginal search cost on the mobile
channel will decrease, leading to a higher number of consumers using the mobile channel for
shopping.
Lastly, we examine the model fit by simulating consumer actions (channel choice, number of
searches, and purchase decision) with the model estimates, and compare simulation results with
the actual data. We run the simulation 100 times and take the average. We compare the conversion
rate by search times on mobile (Figure 1.4A) and PC (Figure 1.4B), and the proportion of
consumers who search one to five times on mobile (Figure 1.4C) and PC (Figure 1.4D). Both the
conversion rates and the search times match well between simulated and actual data on both
channels. The proposed model can predict the key empirical patterns. First, the conversion rate is
higher with a higher number of searches on both channels. Second, the conversion rate is higher
on PC than on mobile for the same number of searches. Third, consumers with more intensive
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searches (who search at least three times) are more likely to choose the PC channel, which matches
well between the simulated and actual data.
Figure 1.4 Model Fit by Comparing Actual and Model Simulated Data
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To summarize, our results suggest the self-selection of consumers can explain the gap in
conversion rates between the two channels. The PC channel has a higher fixed search cost and a
lower marginal search cost, and it attracts consumers with higher valuation toward the product
category who are more likely to make a purchase. The mobile channel has the advantage of a lower
fixed search cost, because of the channel’s great portability and ease of access anywhere. It attracts
consumers who may not find searching on PC to be worthwhile. Therefore, the pool of consumers
the two channels attract can be systematically different before the start of any search activity.
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1.7 Counterfactual
Consumers who choose PC and mobile channels are systematically different. Taking the different
pools of consumers into account, we study how sellers can improve profits by utilizing channelspecific pricing and promotion strategies. Whether sellers are better off charging a lower price or
offering a larger promotion deal on mobile is not obvious. On the one hand, consumers have a
smaller consideration set (lower search intensity) on mobile, which reduces price competition and
allows sellers to set a higher price. On the other hand, the conversion rate is lower on mobile,
which suggests consumers are less inclined to make a purchase and sellers could be better off
lowering prices. The proposed structural model accounts for both effects. With the estimated
model, we can provide a more complete picture for sellers about consumer preferences using
channel-choice information in addition to the search and purchase activities.

1.7.1 The Optimal Pricing Policy on Two Channels
In the first counterfactual, we study how sellers can utilize the information revealed by the
consumer channel choice by offering different prices across channels. In practice, sellers can offer
mobile-only prices for consumers using their smartphones to shop. With different prices on mobile
and PC, in equilibrium, consumers will consider the price distribution on both channels and select
channels accordingly. Therefore, channel-specific prices will also lead to changes in the pool of
customers on both channels. Using our estimated model, we calculate the new equilibrium
situation where sellers set different prices on PC and mobile and consumers have rational
expectations of the price distribution, which influences their channel-choice decisions.
To find the optimal channel-specific prices, we need to estimate the marginal cost of sellers
and the consumer demand function. This approach allows us to find the equilibrium condition, in
which sellers set prices accounting for the customer base on both channels and, additionally,
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consumers choose a channel considering the channel-specific price distribution. Our dataset
contains more than 100 different products. Recovering the marginal cost for each one is
computationally infeasible. We focus on the top 10 products, which account for more than 60% of
the total sales during the data period. The prices of these products range from ¥117 to ¥208
(US$17.6 to $31.2).
To estimate the marginal cost of each seller, we assume the observed prices are the
equilibrium prices when sellers can only choose the same price level for both channels. We first
estimate the consumer demand function. The demand of product 𝑗 with price 𝑝" in channel s is
+

+
𝐷 ( _𝑝" ` = 𝜋 ( ∙ f∑=+62 𝜋+( ∙ 7 ∙ 𝑃s𝑈+( _𝑝" ` > max_𝑈+( _𝑝:"
`, 0`uk,

(13)

where 𝜋 ( is the proportion of consumers who choose channel 𝑠. 𝜋+( is the proportion of consumers
+

searching 𝑏 products on channel s. They search product j with probability 7 , where 𝑁 is the
number of all available products. 𝑈+( _𝑝" ` denotes the utility of product 𝑗 for consumers who search
𝑏 times on channel 𝑠 minus the outside option value. A consumer chooses to purchase 𝑗 if and only
+
if the utility is higher than the utility of all other products browsed 𝑈+( (𝑝:"
), and is larger than 0

(i.e., buying product 𝑗 is more appealing than leaving without a purchase).
To evaluate 𝐷 ( _𝑝" `, we draw the error terms in the model and simulate consumer search
and purchase decisions using the model parameters. With the simulation results, we estimate 𝜋 (
and 𝜋+( by the corresponding average values. For consumers who search 𝑏 times on channel 𝑠, we
evaluate the probability that product 𝑗 offers the highest utility. For each product 𝑗, we obtain price
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draws for the other 𝑏 − 1 products, as well as their individual match values.14 With 1,000 sets of
+
draws, we approximate the probability 𝑃s𝑈+( _𝑝" ` > max_𝑈+( _𝑝:"
`, 0`u by its corresponding

sample average.
We calculate the demand function by changing 𝑝" from 0 to ¥1000, which covers all
observed prices in our dataset. Figure 1.5 plots the demand functions for PC (black dashed line)
and mobile (grey solid line). The demand on PC is higher than on mobile at any given price, due
to the self-selection by which consumers on PC are likely to have higher valuation of the product
category than those on mobile. On both channels, price elasticity of demand is larger for moderate
prices. When price is very low, demand is bounded above by the probability of the product being
browsed. When price is very high, demand converges to 0 because the utility is likely to be lower
than that of the other products or the outside option.
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Figure 1.5 The Estimated Demand Function on PC and Mobile

Note the individual match value e'( is only realized after consumer 𝑖 searches product 𝑗. This is different from search
models (e.g., Honka 2014) where consumers know all the individual match values prior to search. In our model setting,
the distribution of 𝑒)* is not subject to selection. Similarly, prices are also realized after search. Therefore, we can take
unconditional draws from the price distribution and extreme-value type-I distribution in the model simulation.
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With the demand function, we then infer the marginal cost for product 𝑗 assuming that,
given the prices of other sellers, the observed price maximizes the seller profit when the seller sets
a single price for both channels. The marginal cost for seller 𝑗 𝑚𝑐" satisfies the condition
𝑝̂" = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥>+ 𝑅_𝑝" , 𝑚𝑐" ` = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥>+ r_𝑝" − 𝑚𝑐" `𝐷 ( (𝑝" ),
(

where 𝑅(𝑝" , 𝑚𝑐" ) is the profit function for product 𝑗 with price 𝑝" and marginal cost 𝑚𝑐" . With
the profit-maximizing assumption that observed price 𝑝̂" maximizes the seller’s profit, we estimate
the marginal costs for the top 10 sellers.15
Instead of a single price on both channels, sellers can charge channel-specific prices to
maximize profits. Seller 𝑗 chooses prices 𝑝"' on mobile and 𝑝"2 on PC to maximize his expected
profit as a function of the two prices and marginal cost:
𝑀𝑎𝑥>+$ ,>+% 𝑅_𝑝"' , 𝑝"2 , 𝑚𝑐" ` = r_𝑝"( − 𝑚𝑐" `𝐷 ( (𝑝" ),
(

where 𝐷 ( (𝑝" ) is the channel-specific demand function under the new counterfactual prices.
Consumers form rational expectations of the new price distributions on both channels, which will
affect consumers’ channel choice. For example, if prices on mobile are lower than on PC, more
consumers will choose the mobile channel, which will further influence the seller’s optimal prices
on both channels. To find the equilibrium, we iterate between sellers choosing channel-specific
prices given consumer channel choice, and consumers choosing a channel given channel-specific

15

We assume the remaining sellers keep their original uniform pricing on both channels in the counterfactual exercise.
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prices. The process converges when the changes in channel-specific prices are less than 0.1
between iterations.
We find that when sellers charge channel-specific prices, the optimal price on mobile is
lower than that on PC. Across the top 10 sellers, the average optimal price on mobile is ¥163.94,
which is lower than the original uniform price at ¥165.74, whereas the optimal price on PC is
¥168.43, which is higher than the original price. On average, the price on mobile is lower by ¥4.49
(95% confidence interval: ¥3.73 – ¥5.11) or 2.7%. For the top 10 sellers, the optimal price on
mobile is always lower than that on PC, with the magnitude of difference ranging from 1% to 4%
across the sellers. With prices becoming lower on mobile under channel-specific prices, the
conversion rate on mobile increases from 12.51% to 12.85% (or 2.7% in relative terms). We see
the opposite story on PC where the prices become higher under channel-specific prices, and the
overall conversion rate decreases from 16.35% to 16.10% (or 1.5% in relative terms). The overall
pattern of a higher conversion rate on PC than on mobile continues, although the gap becomes
slightly smaller. With channel-specific prices, sellers are able to make higher profits than under
uniform pricing on both channels. Overall, the average profit increases by 0.55% (95% confidence
interval: 0.06% – 0.70%) for the top 10 sellers.
To summarize, we find the optimal prices on mobile is 2.7% lower than that on PC. The
proposed model considers the differences in search pattern and conversion rate on PC and mobile
and shows that prices should be lower on the mobile channel, because of the lower valuation for
consumers shopping on the channel. Ignoring consumer self-selection between the two channels
can lead to incorrect channel-specific prices.
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1.7.2 Optimal Retargeting Strategy for Sellers
In the second counterfactual, we investigate a retargeting strategy by offering coupons to
consumers who have browsed but have not purchased. Similar to the first counterfactual, we
consider the different pools of consumers on mobile and PC. However, consumers who abandon
the search without purchase are systematically different from the total consumer population
targeted in the first counterfactual (see Jiang et al. 2019). We focus on how sellers can use the
channel choice information to offer optimal channel-specific coupons to attract consumers who
have browsed without purchase. Such a retargeting strategy can be economically impactful
because as many as 85% of consumers browse without making a purchase.
We calculate the optimal coupon values offered to retargeted consumers on mobile and PC.
To focus on how the channel choice provides valuable information for sellers, we assume sellers
know which channel consumers chose but not which products they have browsed. Seller 𝑗 chooses
the coupon value 𝑥 on each channel to maximize the expected profit 𝑟" (𝑥):
𝑀𝑎𝑥? 𝑟" (𝑥) = ∑(_𝑝" − 𝑚𝑐" − 𝑥`𝐵"( (𝑥)𝐼 ( ,

(14)

where 𝑝" − 𝑚𝑐" − 𝑥 represents the profit for seller 𝑗 considering the marginal cost (estimated in
the first counterfactual) and coupon value 𝑥. 𝐵"( (𝑥) denotes the purchase probability on channel 𝑠
for seller 𝑗 when he offers a coupon value 𝑥 (the estimation procedure is described later). 𝐼 (
represents the number of consumers who browsed without purchase.16

16

We assume consumers do not anticipate the retargeting coupon (i.e., they will not choose to search and abandon in
order to get a retargeting coupon). Therefore, the percentage of non-purchasers 𝐼 , does not change when the coupon
value 𝑥 varies.
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We calculate the purchase probability 𝐵"( (𝑥) using simulation. We assume that when
sending the coupons, sellers also provide detailed product information including price. Therefore,
retargeted consumers do not need to search for the information and pay the search costs again.
Using the estimated model, we simulate consumer channel-choice, search, and purchase decisions
by drawing 𝑄 = 50 times from the error-term distributions and price distribution for each
consumer. Let 𝐼 (,9 be the number of consumers who do not make a purchase on channel 𝑠 at
simulation 𝑞, and 𝑎8-,/ is the overall category valuation for these non-purchasers, whose outside
option value is 𝑒'8-,/ and the individual match value toward seller 𝑗 is 𝑒"8-,/ .
The purchase probability for seller 𝑗 on channel 𝑠 when the seller offers a coupon value 𝑥
is

𝐵"( (𝑥) =

1s𝑎8-,/ − 𝜆 ∙ _𝑝" − 𝑥` + 𝑒"8-,/ > 𝑒'8-,/ u
1
r
,
𝑄
𝐼 (,9
9

where the numerator calculates the number of non-purchasers who will make a purchase after
receiving coupon 𝑥 . Dividing it by the total number of non-purchasers, we get the purchase
probability for the retargeting coupon 𝑥. 𝐵"( (𝑥) represents the expected purchase probability when
seller 𝑗 sends a coupon worth value 𝑥 to retarget consumers on channel 𝑠.
With estimated 𝐵"( (𝑥), we calculate the optimal coupon value 𝑥 for seller 𝑗 on PC and
mobile given its original price and marginal cost. Similar to the first counterfactual, we focus on
the top 10 sellers. We find the optimal retargeting coupon value is higher for consumers on mobile
than on PC. The optimal coupon value for mobile consumers is ¥5.11 (about 3% of the original
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price) and ¥4.81 for PC consumers. The difference in the coupon values is about ¥0.3 (or 6%)
between the two channels with a 95% confidence interval from ¥0.0076 to ¥0.6057.
With the retargeting coupon, sellers can improve profits by 9.97% on the mobile channel,
and by 10.05% on PC. The overall expected profit increases by 10.01%. We compare it with a
scenario where sellers do not know the consumers’ channel choice. Sellers can only set one
retargeting coupon value for all non-purchasers, regardless of their chosen channel. The optimal
coupon value in this case is ¥4.92. The overall expected profit is lower by 5.1% than the profit
under channel-specific coupons. This finding demonstrates how online sellers can utilize the
channel-choice information for a more effective promotional strategy such as sending out
retargeting coupons.
To summarize, we find sellers’ profit increase is higher when they offer channel-specific
retargeting coupons than when channel choice is not considered. The optimal coupon value is
higher for consumers on mobile than on PC. The result is consistent with that in the first
counterfactual, which suggests a lower optimal price on mobile than on PC. Both results are driven
by the difference in what types of consumers will self-select to browse on mobile phones or PCs.

1.8 Conclusions and Limitations
In this paper, we develop a model of consumer channel choice in addition to search and purchase.
The proposed model can explain an intriguing phenomenon whereby, although more consumers
use mobile phones to shop, the conversion rate is significantly lower than that on PCs. We find the
PC channel has a lower marginal search cost but a higher fixed search cost than the mobile channel.
Consumers with higher product valuation are more likely to use the PC channel because they have
a higher search intensity and will benefit from the lower marginal search cost. Consumers with
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lower product valuation, on the other hand, are more likely to choose the mobile channel because
of its lower fixed cost to start a shopping session.
The estimated model allows us to study channel-specific marketing strategies for sellers.
We find the optimal price on mobile is 2.7% lower than on PC. For non-purchasers, the optimal
retargeting coupon value is 6% higher for consumers on mobile than on PC. Overall, sellers’ profit
will increase if their marketing strategies are channel specific. Both counterfactual analyses
demonstrate how the proposed model can provide sellers with important managerial insights.
Ignoring consumer self-selection between the two channels can lead to incorrect channel-specific
marketing strategies.
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. From a methodological prospective, we
propose a flexible framework that incorporates endogenous consumer channel choice in addition
to the search and purchase decisions. The proposed model can capture the observed search
activities and purchase decisions on both channels. From a managerial perspective, our results
offer guidance to sellers on the optimal channel-specific marketing strategies. We consider
channel-specific prices and retargeting coupons and show how they should be different on the two
channels.
Like all research, our study has limitations. First, the optimal channel-specific prices and
marketing strategies are from counterfactual analysis using one product category on Taobao. We
call for future research to further test these recommendations with actual field experiments. They
should also be tested with a broader range of product categories and in different countries for
generalizability. Second, our proposed model makes several strong assumptions on consumer
search and purchase behaviors. In particular, we assume consumers use simultaneous search
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strategy. Future research with richer datasets should further explore consumers’ channel choice in
other scenarios, such as when consumers use sequential search and when they have prior
knowledge on the differentiated quality of sellers. Results on how consumers who choose to shop
on the two channels are systematically different will help test the robustness of our findings.
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Chapter 2
Time-inconsistent Preferences and Strategic
Self-Control in Digital Content Consumption
Co-authored with Tat Y. Chen, Xueming Luo and Xiaoyi Wang

2.1 Introduction
Consumers widely embrace digital content, such as social media, videos, music, and books.
According to a report from eMarketer,17 adults in the United States on average spent 6 hours and
19 minutes per day on digital media in 2018, overtaking the time spent on traditional media for the
first time. Online video has been the main driver of this phenomenon. Netflix, for example, gained
more than 700 million subscribers in just four years from 2013 to 2017. Demand for other content
has also significantly increased. The rapid growth in the consumption of digital content has raised
concerns about the mental and physical well-being of consumers. Research on consumer digital
content consumption decisions (e.g., Zhang et al. 2012; Boumosleh and Jaalouk, 2017) has shown
that when consumers indulge themselves inside the fantasy world created by video games, online
videos, and web fictions, they can lose self-control and spend more time and money than they
originally intended to. Other consequences include various mental and physical problems. Such
over-consumption behavior has been categorized as a clinical disorder in China since 2008. 18
Being aware of the negative implications of over-consumption may induce consumers to conduct
self-control strategies in advance. Wertenbroch (1998), for example, documents that smokers may

17
18

Source: https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-time-spent-with-media-2018.
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2008/nov/11/china-internet.
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purchase small cigarette packets, to curb future smoking. This strategy may also be used to control
over-consumption in digital content.
The goal of our study is to examine consumers’ digital content consumption behaviors and
their self-control strategies. We focus on a specific type of digital content—web fiction. Web
fiction is available primarily on the Internet, usually released serially by chapters daily. Reading
web fiction is prevalent among Asian consumers: according to a report, more than 400 million
unique readers in China pay for some form of web fiction. A successful web fiction writer can earn
more than 16 million dollars.19 The market size in China reached 18 billion RMB20 in 2018.21 We
use a unique dataset obtained from a major digital book platform in China that provides the content
to subscribers. We observe several unique data features that are related to our research goal. First,
individual consumers, on average, read about 500 chapters per month, with one-fourth reading
1,500 chapters in average. Assuming one chapter takes five minutes to read,22 reading time per
month is 42 hours for an average consumer and 125 hours for the top one-fourth, indicating
individuals spend as much time on web fictions as on other digital media.23 Second, web fiction is
different from literary fiction. It enables readers to immerse themselves in “fantasy pleasure” and
can cause withdrawal symptoms when they try to stop reading.24 Further, as payment from the
online platform to authors is linked to how many chapters an individual reads, authors have an
inherent incentive to include plot twists to keep readers following their books every day. These

19

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/asia/china-online-literature-zhang-wei.html
One RMB is about 0.15 US dollar.
21
Source: “2018 China Digital Reading Market Industry Report” by ASKCI Consulting, 2018. Another article from
Forbes described the rapid growth of web fictions in China that challenges Amazon’s Kindle (see
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jinshanhong/2017/07/17/chinas-online-reading-craze-is-so-big-its-challengingamazons-kindle/#7c48709f4a8c).
22
A chapter contains about 1,000 Chinese characters
23
An average Chinese adult spent nearly 4 hours a day (120 hours per month) on digital media. (Source:
https://www.emarketer.com/content/china-time-spent-with-media-2019)
s24 Source: http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-DDWT201701036.htm
20
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features may cause consumers to read more than they intend to regularly. Finally, we observe an
interesting overpaying phenomenon among consumers: to read web fictions, an individual can
choose either a pay-per-chapter plan (0.1 RMB for each chapter) or a monthly subscription plan
(12 RMB each month). Anyone who reads more than 120 chapters under the former plan or fewer
than 120 chapters under the latter plan will overpay for the reading. We find that, while only 6%
of consumers overpay by choosing the monthly subscription, one-third of consumers consistently
overpay by choosing the pay-per-chapter plan. Among consumers who overpay, 60% switch plans
later if they are under the monthly subscription, but only 20% switch under the pay-per-chapter
plan. Furthermore, most switchers from the monthly subscription (including those who do not
overpay) continue to read a lot after switching, implying that the monetary cost would have been
significantly lower had they not switched. We argue that these overpaying behaviors are consistent
with the idea that consumers use strategic self-control measures to curb over-consumption, which
can have negative long-term consequences.
To formalize the idea, we propose a dynamic structural model that allows consumers to
have different consumption preferences during the reading plan and consumption choice stages. It
characterizes a type of “time-inconsistent” preferences that can lead to over-consumption
behavior. Such time-inconsistent preferences apply to not only digital content consumption
behaviors but also other types of behaviors such as gambling, use of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco.
Furthermore, the model allows for habit formation, as reading more today may increase the reading
preference (leading to reading even more) in the future. Anticipating the potential downsides of
the time-inconsistent preferences and habit formation, rational consumers will impose strategic
self-controls. One of the strategies is to choose a reading plan that will help curb their future
reading, even though doing so could incur a higher monetary cost. This decision implies that a
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forward-looking consumer, when choosing a plan, plays a game against the myopic self during the
consumption stage.
We first use an analytical model to illustrate this argument. We show that, given a set of
model parameters and state of reading preference, a unique equilibrium exists. We also show that,
under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium will converge globally to one of the three steady
states: (1) consumers choose the pay-per-chapter plan, and stay at a low reading preference; (2)
consumers choose the pay-per-chapter plan and remain at a medium state; and (3) consumers pay
monthly subscription and stay at a high state. Depending on the utility parameters, we show that
overpaying by choosing the pay-per-chapter plan can be optimal. We further show that the standard
recursive method that solves the optimal policy function in the dynamic programming literature
can be used in our model, even though the agent exhibits time-inconsistent preferences.
We then construct an econometric model for the empirical analysis by incorporating
unobservable and individual heterogeneities. Estimation results show that, out of the three latent
segments of consumers, the first segment is more price-sensitive and has a higher non-monetary
cost of over-consumption. Interestingly, despite being more price-sensitive, this segment actually
overpays for the consumption due to the self-control reason. In contrast, segment 2 is less likely
to overpay, and about half of the segment chooses the monthly subscription plan. Segment 3 is
small in size; it has the highest reading preference and is most likely to select the monthly
subscription plan.
The findings of this study can have substantive implications not only for public
policymakers but also for producers and distributors of digital content. We use counterfactuals to
study the impacts of pricing plans on consumer welfare and the platform’s profit. We find that if
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the platform were to eliminate the pay-per-chapter plan that helps curb consumption, not only
would it hurt consumer welfare but also its profit, which would drop by 76%. On the other hand,
if the platform were to eliminate the monthly subscription that encourages more consumption, its
profit would increase by 46%, whereas consumer welfare only decreases by 4.5%. Finally, we find
that introducing a new nonlinear pricing plan with volume surcharge can simultaneously improve
the platform’s profit by 46% (almost the same as eliminating the monthly subscription) and the
consumer welfare by 2.5%. It also dominates another nonlinear pricing plan with volume discount
on both dimensions. Overall, our results show that in contrast to the common belief that firms
should offer pricing plans that encourages consumption (e.g., monthly subscription only), offering
a plan that helps curb consumption (e.g., pay-by-chapter and volume surcharge) can increase the
firm profit when consumers have the motivation of self-control. It highlights the necessity of
considering consumers’ self-control behaviors when marketing managers design the pricing
structure for digital content distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the related literature. We
describe the data and present some empirical data patterns in section 2.3 to motivate our modeling
approach. Section 2.4 describes our structural model and estimation strategy. Section 2.5 presents
the estimation and counterfactual results. Finally, section 2.6 concludes.

2.2 Literature
This study is related to the literature on time inconsistency, a concept first formally introduced by
Strotz (1956). Because preferences evolve over time, the optimal choice today may not be the best
in the future. Since Strotz (1956), numerous experimental and empirical studies have shown
different forms of time inconsistency (see Loewenstein and O'donoghue, 2002 for a summary). An
example of time inconsistency is hyperbolic discounting, that is, the discounting rate is much
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higher for future outcomes. Hyperbolic discounting has found support in numerous studies using
experiment or field data (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Redelmeier and Heller, 1993;
Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996; Pender, 1996). Previous literature has also shown
other forms of time inconsistency, for example, the “sign effect,” whereby consumers value future
loss more than gains (Mischel et al., 1969; Yates and Watts, 1975; Loewenstein, 1987; Benzion et
al., 1989; MacKeigan et al., 1993; Redelmeier and Heller, 1993), and the “magnitude effect,”
whereby consumers discount small numbers more than large numbers (Thaler, 1981; Ainslie and
Haendel, 1983; Kirby and Loewenstein, 1987; Benzion et al., 1989; Green et al., 1994a, 1994b;
Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Kirby, 1997). We model how individuals may ignore the consumption
cost during the consumption stage, although they are fully rational when choosing the price plan.
This is consistent with the general definition of time inconsistency in Strotz (1956) but is different
from a typical hyperbolic discounting model setting.
Given the ubiquitous evidence of time-inconsistent behaviors, theoretical and empirical
researchers have further studied to what extent consumers use self-control strategies to solve this
problem, mostly in the form of hyperbolic discounting. Laibson (1997), for example, constructs a
theory to show how dynamically inconsistent preferences could incentivize consumers to constrain
their future choice. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) also use theoretical models to study how
individuals self-control when the cost and reward of consumer decisions do not realize at the same
time. Other studies also examine how consumers can achieve self-control by restricting the
opportunity for additional purchases (Rachlin, 1995), or reducing temptation through substitution
(Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991). The concept of time inconsistency has also been adopted in
empirical studies to explain various types of consumer behaviors that seem to be inconsistent with
classical economic theories. Wertenbroch (1998), for example, uses both experiment and field data
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to show how consumers strategically ration the purchased quantity to restrict excessive
consumption. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) find from data that individuals overpay for a
gym membership. They argue that this overpaying is a strategy to increase future gym use. We
study a similar behavior; however, we show that consumers overpay to curb over-consumption
that will result in future utility loss. Gruber and Köszegi (2001) develop a utility function with
time inconsistency and addictive consumption behaviors. Due to the technical barrier of estimating
such a dynamic model, they calibrate model parameters to show that, due to smokers’ timeinconsistent preferences, the optimal cigarette tax should be higher than under the time-consistent
assumption. Our study makes both methodological and substantive contributions to this stream of
literature. On the methodological side, Caplin and Leahy (2006) have shown that the standard
recursive iteration method cannot be applied to time inconsistency models when more than three
time periods exist. They further suggest that equilibrium may not exist. We show that a unique
equilibrium exists in our model setting and can be computed using the recursive method. Future
researchers could use our method to study other types of time-inconsistent consumer behaviors in
a wide range of markets, including other digital contents and traditional product categories (e.g.,
tobacco, alcohol, and drugs). For the substantive contribution, we use counterfactuals to study the
impacts of marketing actions on firms’ profit and consumer welfare. The implications will be
entirely different without considering the consumer strategic self-control induced by timeinconsistent preferences.
The reason behind time-inconsistent preferences can be related to additive consumption.
The theory of rational addiction in Becker and Murphy (1988) is based on the assumption that
consumers can evaluate the monetary and non-monetary benefits and costs from consumption.
This theory has been adopted in later empirical research studying different consumption behaviors,
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including cigarettes (Chaloupka, 1991; Becker et al., 1994), alcohol (Baltagi and Griffin, 2002),
drugs (Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998; Liu et al., 1999; Olekalns and Bardsley, 1996), and
gambling (Mobilia, 1993). Arcidiacono et al. (2007) study how forward-looking consumers make
decisions for consuming alcohol and tobacco.25 Researchers have also investigated addiction in
social media consumption, Internet browsing, and mobile apps usage (e.g., Young, 1998; Pelling
and White, 2009; Wan, 2009; Kuss and Griffiths, 2011; Kwon et al. 2016). Our model differs from
the rational addiction literature, as we allow consumers to be myopic during the consumption stage
and ignorant of the cost of over-consumption. This is consistent with the medical research (e.g.,
Nestler, 2013) which argues that, because consumption is intrinsically rewarding, consumers may
not correctly evaluate the short- and long-term costs during consumption. A recent study on
addictive usage of smartphones by Boumosleh and Jaalouk (2017) also finds users usually do not
consider health consequences during usage. However, following Becker and Murphy (1988), we
allow consumers to form expectations about their future consumption when choosing the price
plan.

2.3 Data
Our data come from a major digital book platform in China. The data sample includes the reading
activity from 11,346 unique consumers, randomly selected among the existing subscribers of the
platform, for six months from January to June 2017. The platform offers a rich collection of web
fictions. Unlike online books provided by Amazon Kindle, web fictions are mostly written by
amateurs. They are primarily published online, updated daily by chapters. The length of each book

25

In marketing, researchers have documented addictive cigarette consumption and the consequences of a cigarette
tax on demand (Chen, Sun, and Singh, 2009; Wang et al., 2015). Gordon and Sun (2015) use a dynamic model of
rational addiction to study the impacts of a permanent price shift induced by a new cigarette tax on the demand for
cigarettes.
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varies depending on whether it attracts readership. A complete one could easily exceed a thousand
chapters. Each chapter is usually about 1,000 to 5,000 Chinese characters, requiring a few minutes
of reading time. Distinct from literary fictions, which typically refer to fictions with literary merit,
web fictions are classified by genres such as fantasy, romance, and science. Readers follow web
fictions for entertainment, a riveting story, and escape from reality. Given that each chapter is
short, consumers often read multiple books each day. This is different from the “binge-watch”
behavior, wherein consumers spend a short period on intensively watching a whole season of TV
series and then stop.
The platform offers two pricing plans for readers: pay-per-chapter and monthly
subscription. The prices are 0.1 RMB for each chapter under the former plan, and 12 RMB under
the latter.26 Under the pay-per-chapter plan, readers have to swipe a bar on their mobile phones to
confirm the payment before reading each chapter. Under the monthly subscription, readers receive
a text reminder for the payment due a few days before the subscription expires. If readers stop the
subscription, they are automatically switched to the pay-per-chapter plan.
Each period is a month in our analysis. The number of chapters an individual reads in a
month represents his/her consumption level. Because readers start and end monthly subscriptions
at different times, we make an assumption when constructing the dataset: If a reader starts a
subscription before the 15th of a month, we assume he/she starts the subscription at the beginning

26

These prices are equivalent to US $0.015 for each chapter and $1.80 for each month.
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of this month; otherwise, his/her subscription starts at the beginning of next month. We tried
different data-construction methods and found robust results.27

2.3.1 Consumption Behaviors in Data
We use the data to examine consumers’ reading behaviors. We first present an overview of the
reading amount, then look at whether there is a habit formation that is well-known in the marketing
literature. Habit formation is characterized as past consumption enhancing the current
consumption preference, thus creating dynamics in reading behaviors. Next, we investigate
possible time-inconsistent preferences exhibited from the consumption and plan choice stages.
Finally, we examine the evidence that consumers use self-control strategies. These are the two
important components in our dynamic structural model.
Table 2.1 Reading Amount

Reader group

Monthly reading (chapter) Percentage of Population

Overall

506.4

100.00%

Pay-per-Chapter

392.19

74.51%

Monthly Subscription

827.06

25.49%

Overpay for Monthly Subscription

45.92

6.60%

Overpay for Paid-per--by-Chapter

836.03

34.16%

27

For example, we change the date to the 7th or 23rd in each month, and find the data patterns that we present below remain
similar. In the data, 84% of consumers change plans in the first or last week of a month; therefore, using different cut-off dates
does not affect the results.
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Table 2.1 presents a glimpse of the consumption level. The first row shows that an average
consumer reads about 500 chapters per month. Assuming consumers spend five minutes reading
each chapter, this amount represents spending 2,500 minutes per month reading web fiction, or 83
minutes per day. Furthermore, 25% of consumers in the data read more than 700 chapters in a
month, implying they spend about 60 hours a month, or almost two hours each day. If the average
workday is eight hours, the above statistics suggest that in a month, the reading time is equivalent
to 5.2 working days for an average consumer, and 7.5 working days for the top 25%. These suggest
that the non-monetary costs (e.g., time cost and other adverse consequences) of reading could be
very significant. A report from eMarketer shows that US adults, on average, spent 379 minutes per
day on digital media in 2018. Broken down by format, consumers spend 51 minutes per day on
video games28 and 135 minutes on social media.29 The comparison suggests reading web fictions
is as time-consuming as other digital contents.
We test whether increasing exposure from past consumption will increase the current
consumption in our data. Following the model in Becker and Murphy (1994), we specify the habit
stock as an accumulation of past consumption under depreciation. Denoting the state of individual
i in month t as ℎ!@ , the depreciation rate as 𝛿, and the consumption as 𝑐!@ , the habit stock evolves
as the following:
ℎ!,@32 = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ!@ + 𝑐!@ .

(1)

To test the relationship between the habit stock and consumption, we run an ordinary least
squares regression with the reading amount (from second to the last month) as the dependent

28
29

Source: https://www.limelight.com/resources/white-paper/state-of-online-gaming-2018/#spend
Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/433871/daily-social-media-usage-worldwide
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variable and the habit stock in the previous month as an independent variable. Because the habit
stock cannot be directly observed in the data, we calculate it in equation (1), restricting the value
of 𝛿 with a lower bound at 0.36, as suggested by Becker and Murphy (1990). We also assume
every consumer starts at ℎ!2 = 0 in the first month. To control for the heterogeneity in reading
preferences across consumers, we include individual fixed effects in the regression.
Regression results show that the coefficients for ℎ!@ range from 0.05 to 0.005, and for 𝛿
between 0.36 and 1. They are all significant at the 0.001 significance level. The results suggest
that past consumption is positively correlated with future consumption.
To show evidence of time-inconsistent preferences is less straightforward because we do
not observe consumers’ utility during the plan choice and consumption stages. Our strategy is to
show inconsistencies between the pricing plan consumers choose and their reading amount, as
indirect support of the assumption. The second and third rows of Table 2.1 show that the majority
(three-fourth) of consumers choose the pay-per-chapter plan, and as expected, the number of
chapters these consumers read is lower than those read by consumers who choose the monthly
subscription plan. What is surprising is that the average number of chapters read by the consumers
is 392, significantly higher than the 120 chapters over which the optimal plan choice should be a
monthly subscription. Furthermore, the last two rows of Table 2.1 show that the majority of
consumers who overpay choose the pay-per-chapter plan. Their average reading amount is 836
chapters, similar to consumers who choose the monthly subscription plan. All these numbers
suggest that the reading amount of the majority of consumers who choose the pay-per-chapter plan
is not consistent with their choice, indicating possible time-inconsistent preferences in the two
stages.
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Finally, we look for supporting evidence for the strategic self-control assumption.
Assuming consumers know that during consumption, they will not sufficiently consider the costs,
they will have an incentive to take actions during the plan choice stage to curb future consumption.
The most striking data pattern is the proportion of consumers who overpay under the pay-perchapter and monthly subscription plan, as shown in Table 2.1. Over one-third of consumers
overpay by reading too much under the pay-per-chapter plan, whereas only 6.6% consumers
overpay by reading too little under the monthly subscription plan. For the former consumers, the
reading amount is 836 chapters, far higher than the 120 chapters beyond which they should choose
the monthly subscription. The asymmetric overpay ratios of consumers under the two pricing plans
are consistent with the assumption that consumers strategically choose the pay-per-chapter plan to
curb their future consumption.
Table 2.2 Probability of Switching Plans

Switching from

Overall

Overpay

No overpay

Pay-per-Chapter

17.55%

22.65%

12.45%

Monthly Subscription

46.43%

58.44%

34.41%

Table 2.2 offers further evidence in support of the strategic self-control assumption. The
first column reports the probabilities that consumers switch away from the plan they chose last
month. The proportion of consumers who switch away from monthly subscription is far larger than
those who switch away from pay-per-chapter. The next column shows that for consumers who
overpay for pay-per-chapter (by reading too much), only 22.7% switch to the monthly
subscription, whereas the switching probability for those who overpay for the monthly subscription
(by reading too little) is 58.4%. The high switch probability for monthly subscription suggests
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consumers pay attention to the monetary cost and adjust the pricing plan accordingly. The low
switch probability for pay-per-chapter, on the other hand, implies consumers are willing to incur
a higher monetary cost to curb future consumption.
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Readings (chapters/Month)
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Figure 2.1 Number of Chapters Read after Switching to Pay-per-Chapter
Variables

Meaning

Always subs:

Consumers who always purchase monthly
subscription during the data time period

Always chpt:

Consumers who always choose pay-perchapter during the data time period

Subs in xy:

Consumers who choose monthly subscription
from month x to y and then quit
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For self-control to work, one necessary assumption is that consumers are responsive to
monetary cost during the consumption stage. We find from data that after a consumer switches to
pay-per-chapter, the average reading amount drops from 794 to 395 chapters per month. Figure
2.1 breaks down reading amount in the six months of the sample period by consumers who always
choose the monthly subscription, always choose pay-per-chapter, and subscribe in months 1 and
2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4, before they switch to pay-per-chapter. The figure shows that the
consumption level of consumers who always choose monthly subscription increases over time
(from 1,063 to 1,171 chapters). The consumption level of consumers who always choose pay-perchapter is steady between 200 and 300 chapters a month. The consumption level of consumers
who switch from the monthly subscription to pay-per-chapter drops significantly after the switch.
These data patterns suggest switching to pay-per-chapter helps curb consumption. Interestingly,
we find these consumers still overpay for their reading after they switch.

2.3.2 Alternative Explanations
In this subsection, we examine whether several alternative explanations adopted from the past
literature can explain the data patterns presented above. The first one is the rational addiction
theory developed by Becker and Murphy (1988). The habit formation specification that we
presented above is based on their work. However, they do not consider time-inconsistent
preferences. Consequently, the consumption is optimal, and consumers will choose the pricing
plan consistent with their consumption level. In this case, the asymmetrical pattern of overpaying
we show in Table 2.1 should not exist. Therefore, we conclude that the rational addiction theory
cannot explain why overpaying predominantly originates from pay-per-chapter consumers. Later,
in the model estimation, we further show that without time inconsistency, the model fails to predict
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the asymmetric overpaying behavior where a large proportion of consumers stay with their payper-chapter plan and continue overpaying.
Another alternative explanation is that because consumers first make the plan choice and then
go through the consumption process, their reading preferences can experience random shocks in
the second stage. This explanation still cannot explain the asymmetric overpay patterns. We use a
simulation exercise for illustration. For each individual, we assume the reading amount follows an
individual-specific normal distribution. Before making the pricing plan decision, the individual
knows the distribution of his/her reading amount in the next period but not the exact amount and
makes the plan choice that minimizes the expected cost based on the information. We run the
simulation that draws from the empirical distribution of the reading amount for each individual.
We find that the average overpay ratio for consumers who choose pay-per-chapter is about 11.7%
compared with a significantly higher 17.9% for those who choose the monthly subscription.
Overpaying for the monthly subscription is higher because the plan puts an upper bound on the
monetary cost if a positive shock occurs in reading preferences. The result contradicts the empirical
data pattern. The data pattern also rejects the risk aversion or option value explanation for
consumers who choose not to switch to the monthly subscription. This is because the likelihood
that a consumer reads fewer than 120 chapters per month is very small, but the probability that
he/she reads a large amount is very substantial. A consumer should choose the monthly
subscription if he/she is averse to overpaying. Likewise, choosing monthly subscription will have
a higher option value (in the case he/she reads a lot in a month) than the pay-per-chapter plan.
Consumer learning is another explanation. It argues that overpaying behavior can be a result
of people learning about their true preferences over time. To test this explanation, we repeat the
simulation described above, allowing each individual to update his/her belief of the mean reading
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amount in each month based on the reading amount in the previous month. With the learning, the
proportion of consumers overpaying is reduced under the two pricing plans; however, the
overpaying ratio under monthly subscription is still higher than that under the pay-per-chapter
plan.
Table 2.3 Switching Probability after Overpay

Consumer group

Switch probability
Overpay for 1 months Overpay for 2 months Overpay for 3 months

Overpay for Pay-perChapter

22.65%

16.03%

4.95%

Overpay for Monthly
Subscription

58.44%

52.64%

27.64%

Another way to test the learning story is to see how consumers adjust their pricing plans
after overpaying. We calculate the average switch probabilities for consumers who overpay for
one, two, and three months. The results are reported in Table 2.3. Even though consumers who
choose pay-per-chapter predominantly overpay, their switching probabilities are consistently
lower than those who choose the monthly subscription. Furthermore, the switch probabilities
actually decline for those who overpay for a longer period. This clearly contradicts the learning
story, which predicts consumers will adjust their choices accordingly over time.
As another alternative explanation, consumer inattention suggests consumers are not aware
they are overpaying. Table 2.2 shows the switching probability is high (58.4%) when consumers
overpay under monthly subscription for the previous month. Only consumers who overpay under
the pay-by-chapter plan do not switch. Consumer inattention cannot explain this asymmetric
switching pattern. Furthermore, in our empirical context, consumers under pay-per-chapter have
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to agree to pay 0.1 RMB each time they read a new chapter. Because they are constantly reminded
of the payment, inattention does not seem to be the main reason behind the massive scale of
overpaying for such a pricing plan.
Transaction cost or consumer inertia as an alternative explanation for the asymmetric
overpay patterns suggests that consumers find switching from pay-per-chapter to monthly
subscription to be too costly. We do not have direct evidence to rule out such an explanation. In
our empirical context, however, consumers are already registered users of the platform. Because
they do not have to provide any personal information or change their payment method, consumers
can switch with just one click. Given the average overpaying amount is more than four times the
cost of a monthly subscription, transaction costs are unlikely to be the reason for not switching.
One may argue that the costs are not about registration but are related to the effort of
making payment. However, under the pay-per-chapter plan, consumers need to swipe the bar on
their smartphones to pay for each chapter they read. Such effort is costlier than making one upfront
payment for a monthly subscription. Again, the transaction cost explanation does not seem to hold
in our empirical context.
The asymmetric overpay pattern may be explained by the non-monetary benefit of pay-perchapter. For example, once a consumer pays for a chapter, he/she can always re-read the chapter,
whereas that option is not available for the monthly subscription once he/she stops the subscription.
This is not true in our context. Once the consumer pays for one chapter, he/she can only read it
within 30 days. This restriction makes access to any chapter under pay-per-chapter identical to the
monthly subscription. Another potential non-monetary benefit of pay-per-chapter for consumers
lies in its option value, in the sense that consumers can always switch from pay-per-chapter to
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monthly subscription but cannot freely switch back to pay-per-chapter within one subscription
cycle (30 days). There can be a psychological benefit due to payment flexibility. We find from
data that consumers who pay by chapters read on average 800 chapters per month, and more than
80% of them never read below 120 chapters. Given the consistently high reading amount,
consumers need to perceive an exceedingly large psychological benefit of the pay-per-chapter plan
for them not to switch.
Another alternative explanation, over-confidence, suggests that consumers overestimate
their self-control ability in the future, and thus, underestimate the future reading amount. The
assumption behind this is that they are naive time-inconsistent consumers who are not aware of
how they will make choices during the consumption stage. Although this explanation cannot be
completely ruled out, we find that it is not likely to be the main reason consumers overpay for their
reading. The majority of those who overpay with pay-per-chapter continue with their plan for more
than four months. It is unreasonable to assume that, after such a long time, consumers still believe
that they can keep their reading amount below 120 chapters, when the actual average reading
amount is consistently far higher than that. We should observe consumers to eventually switch to
the monthly subscription. The same argument is made in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). As
a more formal test, we estimate a model with naive time-inconsistent consumers. Estimation results
suggest that consumers would need to underestimate future reading by an unreasonably large
amount. Details are in the next section.
The last potential explanation is that consumers do not care about the small price of 0.1
RMB under pay-per-chapter and end up overpaying. In this case, we should not find consumers
reduce their consumption after they switch from monthly subscription to pay-per-chapter. In our
data, however, the average reading amount after consumers switch to pay-per-chapter drops from
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794 to 395 chapters per month, suggesting their consumption is responsive to the price of each
additional chapter they read.
To conclude, although the alternative explanations we list above may explain some of the
data patterns, they are inconsistent with either the asymmetric overpaying and switching patterns
or the change in consumption behaviors in the data. We acknowledge that time-inconsistent
preference and strategic self-control may not be the only mechanism driving the data observations;
other potential behavioral explanations that we have not examined may still exist.

2.4 The model and its Estimation
In this section, we first use an analytical model to demonstrate under what conditions consumers
will overpay as an optimal behavior. We then develop an econometric model with stochastic
components and estimate the model from data. We discuss the estimation method and the model
identification.

2.4.1 An Analytical Model and Its Equilibrium
In the dynamic programming literature, the recursive method has proved to be a useful tool to
solve dynamic problems. When agents have time-inconsistent preferences, however, equilibrium
may not be computed using the solution concept (e.g., Peleg and Yaari, 1973; Caplin and Leathy,
2006), because value-function iteration may not converge, and thus the optimal policy function
does not exist. Our model features both habit formation and time-inconsistent preferences under
rational agent behavior. We show a unique equilibrium exists in the model. We further show the
existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium. We characterize how the equilibrium varies
depending on model parameters and the state of consumption stock.
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In the model, a consumer chooses either pay-per-chapter (s = 0) or monthly subscription
(s = 1) at the beginning of each period, then decides the level of consumption conditional on the
chosen plan. The price for each chapter is 𝑝1 under pay-per-chapter, and 𝑝( for the monthly
subscription. The consumption utility is influenced by the habit stock, h. The utility during the
consumption process is different from the utility when the consumer makes the pricing-plan
choice.
Starting with the utility function during consumption, we specify a quadratic utility
function as follows:
𝑢1 (𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) = (𝛼1 + 𝛼1A ∙ ℎ) ∙ 𝑐 − 𝛼11 ∙ 𝑐 & − 𝜇 ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠 = 0} ∙ 𝑐 ,

(2)

where 𝑎1A captures how the habit stock h may change the marginal utility of consumption, and 𝜇
is the price coefficient representing the marginal disutility of the monetary cost during the
consumption stage. It only occurs if the consumer chooses pay-per-chapter; otherwise, the price
of reading a chapter is zero. Given s and h, the consumer chooses the optimal 𝑐 ∗ (𝑠, ℎ). It is
straightforward to derive that
𝑐 ∗ (𝑠, ℎ) =

-0 3-01 ∙A:D∙>0 ∙2{(6'}
&∙-00

if 𝑐 ∗ ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise.

(3)

Suppose 𝜇 is positive. The optimal 𝑐 ∗ when s=0 is lower than that when s=1.
Time-inconsistency in our model comes from consumers who, when choosing the pricing
plan, consider the non-monetary costs of consumption (e.g., time, negative health impact from
excessive smartphone usage) that they do not fully take into account in 𝑢1 (𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ). A difference in
the monetary cost between the consumption stage and plan-choice stage can also exist (e.g., the
consumer may care less about price once he/she has indulged in reading). We use 𝛾 to represent
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the total difference in the marginal cost for reading each chapter. The utility function when the
consumer chooses the pricing plan is specified as follows:
𝑢> (𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) = 𝑢1 (𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) − 𝛾 ∙ 𝑐.

(4)

We assume the consumer is a “sophisticated” type, as proposed by Strotz (1956). That is,
the consumer is aware that during consumption her choice is 𝑐 ∗ (𝑠, ℎ) in equation (3) without the
cost 𝛾 ∙ 𝑐. Furthermore, she is forward-looking as she considers how her current consumption can
affect her future habit and thus the consumption. Formally, the consumer chooses a pricing plan
by solving the following value function:
𝑉(ℎ) = max 𝑢> (𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) − 𝜇 ∙ 𝑝( ∙ 1{𝑠 = 1} + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ$ ) ,

(5)

ℎ$ = (1 − 𝛿 )ℎ + 𝑐

(6)

(

where

Equation (6) illustrates how the habit stock in the next period will evolve following the current
consumption c.
Because the utility function is continuous under either pricing plan, value function V is
continuous in state space h. Assuming h is a compact set bounded above, for any parameter set,
the contraction mapping theorem will hold so that the dynamic programming problem is
guaranteed to have a unique fixed point for V. Therefore, for any h, a unique equilibrium exists in
our model. This finding is different from other studies of time inconsistency in preferences,
because we assume the consumer is myopic during the consumption stage. The optimal
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consumption thus can be solved as in equation (3) and, as a result, the optimal plan choice in
equation (5) is reduced to a standard dynamic programming problem.
The unique optimal policy function that solves the dynamic problem in equation (5) is a
function of h and model parameters. First, define the following variables:
%2

%

𝐴 = G%01 ; 𝑒 = (1 − 𝛿) + &%01 ;
00

00

𝐵' =

(%0 :D>0 :I)∙%01

𝐵2 =

(-0 :I)∙-01

&%00

&-00

; 𝐶' =

; 𝐶2 =

(%0 :D>0 )∙(%0 :D>0 :&I)
G%00

-0 ∙(-0 :&I)
G-00

; 𝑓' =

-

− 𝜇𝑝( ; 𝑓2 = &-0 .
00

Let

⎧
⎪

K

𝑎' = 2:L/ 2 ,
𝑏' =

M$ 3&L/0$ -$

,
2:L/
⎨
⎪𝑐 = *$ 3L-$ 0$2 3L+$ 0$ ,
⎩ '
2:L
and

⎧
⎪

K

𝑎2 = 2:L/ 2 ,
𝑏2 =

M% 3&L/0% -%

,
2:L/
⎨
⎪𝑐 = *% 3L-% 0%2 3L+% 0% .
⎩ 2
2:L
Finally, define the “cut-offs” as
% :D>0

ℎ2(( = &N%0

00 :%01

, ℎ&(( = &N%

%0
00 :%01

, and
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%0 :D>0
&%00

;

ℎ2∗ = (𝑐' − 𝑐2 )/(𝑏2 − 𝑏' ); ℎ&∗ =

(2:L)(1$ :1% )3L(+% :+$ )0%
(2:L/)(+% :+$ )

, ℎ&∗∗ =

(2:L)(1% :1$ )3L(+% :+$ )0$
(2:L/)(+% :+$ )

.

We use the standard recursive method to solve for the value function and the optimal policy
function, and obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Assuming parameters 𝛼1 , 𝛼1A , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆 are nonnegative, the following unique
equilibrium exists:
1A. If ℎ2(( ≤ ℎ2∗ < ℎ&(( ,
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ > ℎ2∗
𝑠 ∗ (ℎ) = ›
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ ≤ ℎ2∗
1B. If ℎ&(( ≤ ℎ2∗ ,
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ > ℎ&∗
𝑠 ∗ (ℎ) = ›
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ ≤ ℎ&∗
1C. If ℎ2∗ < ℎ2(( ,
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ > ℎ&∗∗
𝑠 ∗ (ℎ) = ›
.
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ ≤ ℎ&∗∗

Proof: See Appendix A.1.30
Proposition 1 establishes that a unique equilibrium always exists. Depending on the
parameter condition listed in 1A, 1B, and 1C, the cutoff points ℎ2∗ , ℎ&∗ , and ℎ&∗∗ will vary, and thus
the optimal plan choice will be different. Following the equilibrium plan choice, the consumption

30

We require steady states to be nonnegative in the proof. This requirement is not necessary for the general setup.

70

level follows equation (3). Because now we have an analytical solution to our model, given an
initial value h, we can predict how it will evolve and where the steady state is. Based on
Proposition 1, we can derive how the plan choice and consumption level will converge to the
steady-state equilibrium as follows:
Lemma: Based on Proposition 1, with any initial habit stock ℎ' , the following steady-state
equilibria exist:
i)

if the condition in 1A is satisfied,
lim ℎ@ = ℎ2(( ∙ {ℎ' < ℎ2∗ } + ℎ&(( ∙ {ℎ' ≥ ℎ2∗ };

@→4

ii)

if the condition in 1B is satisfied,
lim ℎ@ = ℎ2((

@→4

iii)

if the condition in 1C is satisfied,
lim ℎ@ = ℎ&((

@→4

The lemma essentially guarantees all steady states are globally convergent steady states.
Figure 2.2 provides a graphic illustration. In each panel of the figure, the x-axis denotes the currentperiod habit stock, and the y-axis the next-period habit stock. The black solid line is the policy
function which returns a unique value of next-period given current habit stock level, with arrows
indicating how it evolves over time. The steady states are located at the intersection of the path
and the 45-degree line, on which the state in the next period is the same as the current period.
Under the condition in 1A in the top panel, if the habit stock starts below ℎ2∗ , consumers will always
choose pay-per-chapter, and h will converge to the “low” steady state ℎ2(( ; otherwise, they will
choose the monthly subscription, and h will converge to the “high” steady state ℎ&(( . In the second
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panel, when the condition in 1B is satisfied, h will converge to the steady state ℎ2(( , regardless of
where the initial consumption stock state is. If the initial state ℎ' is very high (> ℎ&∗ ), consumers
first choose monthly subscription, then switch to pay-per-chapter when h drops below ℎ&∗ . The gap
on ℎ&∗ indicates the change in consumption level when they switch plans. The last panel in the
figure demonstrates when the condition in 1C is satisfied. Regardless of where the initial
consumption stock state is, consumers will eventually choose monthly subscription and converge
to the high steady state ℎ&(( .
ℎ$%"

ℎ"''
ℎ$%"

45!

Parameter condition
1A

ℎ"∗

ℎ$

ℎ&''
45!

Parameter condition
1B

ℎ"''

ℎ&∗
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ℎ$

ℎ$%"

45!

Parameter condition
1C

ℎ&∗∗

ℎ&''

ℎ$

Figure 2.2 Dynamics of the Steady States

When no time-inconsistency exists (either 𝛾 = 0 or 𝛾 ∙ 𝑐 also affects the utility function in
the consumption stage), overpaying can never be the optimal choice. For any consumption amount
above 𝑝( ⁄𝑝1 chapters, consumers should always choose the monthly subscription. Under timeinconsistent preferences, however, consumers may overpay by choosing pay-per-chapter to
prevent excessive consumption. The equilibrium characterized in proposition 1 provides a clear
illustration on how time-inconsistent preferences and strategic self-control together can explain
the unique data features we observe in section 2.3:
1. Consumers overpay by consistently choosing pay-per-chapter: In the first two panels of
Figure 2.2, consumers choose the plan at the steady-state equilibrium even though ℎ2(( can
be at a level that is costlier for pay-per-chapter.
2. Consumers switch to pay-per-chapter but still overpay: The second panel indicates
consumers in a high state will switch from subscription to pay-per-chapter and decrease
their consumption toward ℎ2(( . During the process, consumers may overpay for pay-perchapter. They may still overpay at the steady state ℎ2(( .
3. Asymmetric overpay patterns: We have shown consumers have incentive to overpay under
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pay-per-chapter. It is easy to show that when consumers choose the monthly subscription
(i.e., 𝑠 ∗ (ℎ) = 1 in Proposition 1), their reading amount will never be below 𝑝( ⁄𝑝1 chapters
a month.

2.4.2 An Econometric Model
In the analytical model, the plan choice and consumption level are deterministic. In reality,
however, observed data will not be perfectly aligned with model predictions due to unobserved
factors. To explain fluctuations in the plan choice and consumption across and within individuals,
we construct an econometric model so that such fluctuations can be estimated from data. The
model is similar to the analytical model, but it incorporates stochastic components in the utility
functions. Furthermore, we allow heterogeneous model parameters across consumers to capture
the fact that some consumers’ reading preferences can be systematically different from the others.
And we also allow the non-monetary cost of reading web fiction to change given different level of
habit stock h.31 For individual i in period t, the utility function during the consumption stage that
corresponds to equation (2) is modified as follows:
𝑢!@ (𝑐!@ , 𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ ) = _𝛼!1 + 𝜔!@ + 𝛼!,1A ∙ ℎ!@ ` ∙ 𝑐!@ − 𝛼!,11 ∙ 𝑐!@& − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0} ∙ 𝑐!@ (7)
In this function, 𝜔!@ represents the unobserved factors that may affect the marginal utility
of consumption in each period. The individual-specific model parameters capture the
heterogeneity across consumers.
The consumption level that corresponds to equation (3) therefore is

31

Since such change of model setting do not affect the consumption stage decisions when compared to the baseline
model, it is straightforward to see all essential model properties and proof are unaffected even if we apply such
change into the analytical model we discussed in the last section.
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%!0 3%!,01 ∙A!3 :D! ∙>0 ∙2{(!3 6'}

𝑐!@∗ (𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ›

&∙%!,00

P

+ &∙%!3 , 0Ÿ .
!,00

(8)

Note the consumption level cannot be negative; therefore, 𝑐!@∗ (𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ ) in equation (8) is bounded
below by 0.
For the marginal cost of reading each chapter, we allow 𝛾 (see equation 4) to be
heterogeneous among consumers. In addition, we allow the cost to change as the habit state
increases. That is, 𝛾!@ = 𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@ . This setting implies that an individual’s time-inconsistency
in terms of plan and consumption choices can be dynamically evolving.
We assume that when making the plan choice, the consumer only knows the distribution
of 𝜔!@ and not the exact value. The consumer will choose a plan that maximizes the expected value
function. Two additional stochastic terms, 𝑒!@' and 𝑒!@2 , will affect the utility of choosing pay-perchapter and monthly subscription, respectively. Corresponding to equations (5) and (6), the
consumer’s dynamic problem of plan choice is specified as follows:
𝑉!@ (ℎ!@ , 𝑒!@' , 𝑒!@2 ) = max 𝐸P 𝑢!@ (𝑐!@∗ (𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ ), 𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ ) − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝( ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 1}
(!3 6{',2}

−(𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@ ) ∙ 𝑐 ∗ (𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ )
+𝑒!@' ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0} + 𝑒!@2 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 1}
'
2
+𝛽 ∙ 𝐸P 𝐸/ 𝑉!,@32 _ℎ!,@32 , 𝑒!,@32
, 𝑒!,@32
`,

(9)

where
ℎ!,@32 = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ!@ + 𝑐 ∗ (𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ ).

(10)
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The expectation operator 𝐸P in equation (9) integrates over 𝜔!@ and another 𝐸/ integrates over
'
2
𝑒!,@32
and 𝑒!,@32
in the next period. Given 𝜔!@ , the expected value function in the third line of

equation (9) can be specified as
'
2
'
'
2
2
𝐸/ 𝑉!,@32 _ℎ!,@32 , 𝑒!,@32
, 𝑒!,@32
` = 𝐸/ 𝑚𝑎𝑥E𝑉!,@32
_ℎ!,@32 , 𝑒!,@32
`, 𝑉!,@32
_ℎ!,@32 , 𝑒!,@32
`F,

(11)

'
2
where 𝑉!,@32
and 𝑉!,@32
represent the value function conditional on choosing pay-per-chapter and

monthly subscription, respectively. In the empirical application, we assume 𝜔!@ is distributed as
𝑁(0, 𝜎P& ) , where 𝜎P& is the variance, and is independent and identically distributed across
consumers and periods. Furthermore, 𝑒!@' and 𝑒!@2 are extreme-value type I distributed with zero
location parameter and a scale parameter 𝜏.
In the value function, the state variable is ℎ!@ . Suppose the state space is a closed interval
on ℛ2 denoted by [0, H]. We discretized the state space into N grid points, and assume ℎ!@ is
constant within an interval [

(.:2)Q .Q
7

,

7

] , where 𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁} . Based on the distribution

assumption of 𝜔!@ and our model setting, we can derive that given the plan choice 𝑠!@ and current
state ℎ!@ , the conditional distribution of ℎ!,@32 follows a truncated normal distribution 𝑔 with
support on [0,H], with mean 𝜇(ℎ!@ , 𝑠!@ ) = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ!@ +

%!0 3%!,01 ∙A!3 :D! ∙>0 ∙2{(!3 6'}
&∙%!,00

and variance

R2

equal to G- 4 . The distribution satisfies the Markov property of memorylessness. Let 𝜃 be the
!,00

collection of model parameters. The distribution function of ℎ!,@32 , unconditional on 𝑠!@ , is
R2

𝑓_ℎ!,@32 Pℎ!@ , 𝜃`~𝑝(𝑠!@ = 0|ℎ!@ , 𝜃)g £𝜇(ℎ!@ , 0|𝜃), G- 4 ¤ +
!,00

R2

𝑝(𝑠!@ = 1|ℎ!@ , 𝜃)g £𝜇(ℎ!@ , 1| 𝜃 ), G- 4 ¤,
!,00
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where 𝑝 is the probability of choosing a pricing plan. The probability of h in interval m falling into
another interval n in the next period therefore is
67
8
2 (𝜃)
𝑝ST
= ∫(6:%)7
𝑓(ℎ′|ℎ ∈ 𝑚, 𝜃)𝑑ℎ′.
8

Denote the transition matrix
𝑝222 (𝜃)
𝑀2 (𝜃) = ¥
⋮
𝑝2 7,2 (𝜃)

⋯
⋱
⋯

𝑝22,7 (𝜃)
©.
⋮
𝑝2 7,7 (𝜃)

(
Similarly, denote the transition probability from state m to state n after s periods as 𝑝ST
(𝜃) and

similarly the transition matrix as 𝑀 ( (𝜃). We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2: For any model parameters 𝜃, there exists a unique stationary distribution (or
(
limiting distribution) equilibrium for the state. That is, 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑝ST
(𝜃) = 𝑝T (𝜃) exists for any m, n =
(→4

1, 2, …, N. Let 𝑝(𝜃) = (𝑝2 (𝜃), 𝑝& (𝜃), … , 𝑝7 (𝜃)), where 𝑝T (𝜃) ≥ 0, ∑7
T62 𝑝T (𝜃) = 1, under the
stationary distribution equilibrium, we have 𝑝(𝜃)𝑀2 (𝜃) = 𝑝(𝜃). This implies

𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑀

(→4

( (𝜃)

𝑝2 (𝜃 ) 𝑝& (𝜃)
=¥
⋮
𝑝2 (𝜃) 𝑝& (𝜃)

⋯
⋯

𝑝7 (𝜃)
⋮ ©.
𝑝7 (𝜃)

Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 guarantees that, for any set of model parameters, a unique stationary
distribution for h exists. Therefore, regardless of the initial distribution, a unique distribution of h
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will exist under a sufficiently large number of iterations. This property helps us solve the initial
value problem in the model estimation.

2.4.3 Model Estimation
Based on the assumption that 𝑒!@' and 𝑒!@2 are extreme-value type I distributed with zero location
parameter and a scale parameter 𝜏, we can rewrite
V!- WA!,3<% X
U

'
2
𝐸/ 𝑉!,@32 _ℎ!,@32 , 𝑒!,@32
, 𝑒!,@32
` = 𝜏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝜏 ∙ ln f∑(6{',2} exp f

Y

kk ,

(12)

where r is the Euler constant, and
∗
𝑉«!( _ℎ!,@32 ` = 𝐸P 𝑢!@ _𝑐!,@32
_𝑠!,@32 = 𝑠, ℎ!,@32 `, 𝑠!,@32 = 𝑠, ℎ!,@32 `

∗
−(𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@ ) ∙ 𝑐!,@32
_𝑠!,@32 = 𝑠, ℎ!,@32 `

#

+𝛽 ∙ 𝐸P ¬𝜏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝜏 ∙

V - WA
U
X
ln ¬∑(# 6{',2} exp ¬ ! Y!,3<2 ---.

(13)

Substitute equation (12) into equation (9), we can rewrite the dynamic plan-choice problem as
𝑉!@ (ℎ!@ , 𝑒!@' , 𝑒!@2 ) = max{𝑉«!' (ℎ!@ ) + 𝑒!@' , 𝑉«!2 (ℎ!@ ) + 𝑒!@2 },

(14)

where
𝑉«!( (ℎ!@ ) = 𝐸P 𝑢!@ (𝑐!@∗ (𝑠!@ = 𝑠, ℎ!@ ), 𝑠!@ = 𝑠, ℎ!@ ) − (𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@ ) ∙ 𝑐 ∗ (𝑠!@ = 𝑠, ℎ!@ )
#
𝑉«!( _ℎ!,@32 `
+𝛽 ∙ 𝐸P ®𝜏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝜏 ∙ ln ® r exp ¯
°±±.
𝜏
#

( 6{',2}
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Proposition 1 shows that for the analytical model, a unique equilibrium exists; therefore,
the value function 𝑉«!( (ℎ!@ ) can be solved through the iteration method. For the econometric model,
however, the existence of the unique equilibrium is difficult to prove. For each ℎ!@ in the state
space, we use different initial values for 𝑉«!( (ℎ!@ ) in the model estimation, and find the iteration
method always converges to the same value. Therefore, we assume 𝑉«!( (ℎ!@ ) will converge to the
unique equilibrium in practice even with the stochastic components.
Given the distribution assumption for 𝑒!@' and 𝑒!@2 , Rust (1987) shows the plan-choice
probability has the following analytical expression:
V!- (A!3 )/Y)
Z[\ (U
V % (A!3 )/Y)
!3 )/Y)3Z[\ (U

𝑃!@( (ℎ!@ ) = Z[\( UV $ (A
!

(15)

!

Let 𝑐!@ be the observed consumption level that is bounded below by zero. Conditional on
the plan choice 𝑠!@ and the assumption that 𝜔!@ is distributed as 𝑁(0, 𝜎P& ) , the likelihood of
observing 𝑐!@ can be derived from equation (8) as follows:
1|(
𝑃!@ (𝑐!@ |𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ )

1 − Φ_𝛼!1 + 𝛼!,1A ∙ ℎ!@ − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0}`,
=²
𝛼!1 + 𝛼!,1A ∙ ℎ!@ − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0}
𝜙 ¬ 2 ∙ 𝑐!@ ∙ 𝛼!,11 −
-,
2 ∙ 𝑎!,11

𝑖𝑓 𝑐!@ = 0
, (16)
𝑖𝑓 𝑐!@ > 0

where 𝜙 and Φ are the probability density function and cumulative density function of the normal
distribution with mean zero and variance 𝜎P& .
Combining the likelihoods in (15) and (16), the full likelihood function for observation
(𝑐!@ , 𝑠!@ ), conditional on the habit stock ℎ!@ and individual-specific model parameters 𝜃! , is
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1|(
𝐿(𝑐!@ , 𝑠!@ |ℎ!@ , 𝜃! ) = 𝑃!@2 (ℎ!@ , 𝜃! )(!3 62 ∙ 𝑃!@' (ℎ!@ , 𝜃! )(!3 6' ∙ 𝑃!@ (𝑐!@ |𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ , 𝜃! ).

(17)

To evaluate the likelihood function, however, we need to solve an initial value problem,
because the consumption stock state when the sample period starts, ℎ!' , is unobserved in the data.
Given individual-specific model parameters, ℎ!' can be systematically different across consumers.
Ignoring this problem can lead to biased model estimates. To deal with the problem, recall that
Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of a stationary distribution of h. We assume at the beginning
of period 1 the state variable ℎ!' of each individual comes from the stationary distribution. We
simulate the stationary distribution as a function of the individual-specific model parameters, and
draw ℎ!' multiple times from this distribution. We then calculate the likelihood function
conditional on the simulated ℎ!' , and finally take the average of the likelihoods across draws to
obtain the simulated likelihood. Given a trial value 𝜃, the detailed estimation procedure is as
follows:
1. We first numerically solve the value function 𝑉!@ (ℎ!@ , 𝑒!@' , 𝑒!@2 ) defined in equation (14). We set
the state space for habit stock ℎ!@ as [0, 2000].32 We discretize the state space into grids with
length of 10, and linearly interpolate the value function within the range.
2. Next, we calculate the stationary distribution of the state variable h. With the numerical
solution of the value function, we can calculate the value of the plan-choice probability 𝑃 ( (ℎ)
with equation (15) for any given ℎ!@ . Define interval [10(m-1), 10m] as state m for h. Starting
from any value of ℎS with state m, the probability for h to transfer from state m to state n,
𝑝ST (𝜃), can be calculated by

32

We choose the maximum state space as 2,000 because it covers most of the data range (95%). We have also tried
other values as large as 10,000 and the estimation results are robust.
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𝑝ST (𝜃) = r

𝑃 ( (ℎS )

(∈{',2}

2'T

𝜎_&
¶
g ¬𝜇(ℎ^ , 𝑠|𝜃),
- 𝑑ℎT .
4𝑎!,11
2'(T:2)

Define the transfer matrix as
𝑀

2 (𝜃)

𝑝22 (𝜃)
⋮
=¥
𝑝&'',2 (𝜃)

⋯
⋱
⋯

𝑝2,&'' (𝜃)
⋮
©.
𝑝&'',&'' (𝜃)

Proposition 2 shows a unique nonnegative vector P(𝜃) = (𝑝2 (𝜃), 𝑝& (𝜃), … , 𝑝&'' (𝜃)) exists
such that
(1) ∑&''
T62 𝑝T (𝜃) = 1
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To compute the limit, we calculate (𝑀(𝜃))T recursively until |𝑀(𝜃)T32 − 𝑀(𝜃)T | < 0.01,
and obtain the stationary distribution Ρ(𝜃).
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T
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can be computed from the monthly reading amount. This approach enables us to calculate the
simulated maximum likelihood function as
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During the parameter search, we use the gradient optimization method (BFGS). After it
converges, we then switch to the Nelder-Meade numerical optimization. We repeat the
procedure until the increase in the log likelihood becomes trivial (<1e-2). From different
start points, we find such an algorithm can effectively reach the same global optimum
without falling into some local optimum when we only use one method.
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2.4.4 Identification
For ease of discussion, we ignore the heterogeneity in model parameters across consumers. The
parameters in the model include all parameters in the utility functions, and the variance for 𝜔’s
and the scale parameter for e’s, that is, {𝛼1 , 𝛼11 , 𝛼1A , 𝛾' , 𝛾2 , 𝜇, 𝜏, 𝜎P }. Two additional parameters,
{𝛽, 𝛿}, represent the discounting factor and the depreciation rate of the consumption stock state.
Following the previous literature, we fix 𝛽 = 0.98 as the monthly discounting factor. This value
is equivalent to the daily discounting factor 0.998, as suggested in DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2006). For the depreciation rate 𝛿, we find from practice that it is difficult to be separately
identified from 𝛼1A , the parameter that captures the effect of the consumption stock state on the
marginal utility of consumption. During the estimation, we vary 𝛿 from 0.1 to 0.9, and choose the
one (𝛿 = 0.8) that maximizes the likelihood function. We test the robustness by varying the value
of the two parameters, and find the main results remain unchanged.
Parameters in the consumption utility function, including {𝛼1 , 𝛼11 , 𝛼1A , 𝜎P }, are identified
from the data on monthly reading amounts. For those who choose monthly subscription, equation
(8) shows that multiplying a constant on 𝛼1 , 𝛼11 , and 𝛼1A will not change the consumption level.
Therefore, we normalize 𝑎11 = 0.5 . The optimal consumption level thus is 𝑐!@ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝛼1 +
𝛼1A ℎ!@ + 𝜔!@ , 0}. Given the consumption states across consumers, we can identify parameters 𝛼1 ,
𝛼1A , and the variance 𝜎P .
The price coefficient 𝜇 is identified from the difference in the reading amount for the same
individual after she switches pricing plans. Suppose the consumer switches from monthly
subscription to pay-per-chapter and the reading amount significantly drops. This finding would
suggest she has a higher value of 𝜇. Given the parameters in the consumption utility, the disutility
parameters from excessive consumption, (𝛾' , 𝛾2 ), are identified by the proportion of consumers
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who overpay for pay-per-chapter, relative to the proportion of consumers who overpay under
monthly subscription across different level of habit stock. In other words, the identification comes
from the asymmetric overpay pattern across consumers with different consumption pattern history.
The larger the proportion of consumers who read more than 120 chapters per month and do not
choose monthly subscription, the larger 𝛾' is among consumers. And the larger overpay amount
for consumers who have higher habit stock after controlling for the effect of 𝛾' , the larger 𝛾2 is
among consumers.
Finally, the scale parameter 𝜏 is identified from the plan choice and the corresponding
reading amount. Suppose, given all other model parameters, the expected value from one pricing
plan is higher than the other. If the probability that consumers choose the high-valued plan is not
much higher than the low-valued plan, this scenario implies a large 𝜏. Note that 𝜏 cannot be
identified if we only observe the plan choice. We need the reading amount together with the plan
choice to pin down the parameter.

2.5 Results
In this section, we first discuss the estimation results of the proposed model. We will then discuss
the estimation results from an alternative model under which there are no time-inconsistent
preferences and another model assuming consumers are naïve in forming expectation about their
consumption choice. Based on the proposed model, we use counterfactuals to show how changing
the pricing plan options available to consumers would affect the consumer welfare and the
platform’s profit. Finally, we show that a new nonlinear pricing plan with volume surcharge could
simultaneously improve the consumer welfare and the platform’s profit. Our findings help shed
light on firms’ pricing strategies for product or service categories for which consumers’ strategic
self-control behaviors are prevalent.
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2.5.1 Estimation Results
Table 2.4 Main Estimation Results

beta=0.98 Observation=68,7068
Segment 1

s.e.

𝑎1

-124.20

1.13

𝑎1A

0.86

0.00

𝜇

7.61

0.44

𝛾'

124.36

33.49

𝛾2

0.57

0.02

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎_

6.57

0.00

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎/

8.24

0.03

Log likelihood

-439259

AIC

878532

BIC

Segment 1

s.e.

Segment 2

s.e.

𝑎1

-124.33

2.29

0.06

11.31

𝑎1A

0.68

0.01

0.87

0.01

𝜇

9.31

1.72

0.57

0.13

𝛾'

124.38

88.71

124.32

153.87

𝛾2

2.08

0.21

0.29

0.10

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎_

6.52

0.00

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎/

8.24

0.24

Class size

0.54

Log likelihood

-430996

1-class

2-class

878595

0.46
AIC
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862019

BIC

862138

Segment 1

s.e.

(self-controllers)

3-class

Segment 2

s.e.

(powerless
habitual readers)

Segment 3

s.e.

(enthusiastic readers)

𝑎1

-44.97

3.88

-37.93

4.49

627.21

34.27

𝑎1A

0.76

0.01

0.79

0.01

1.46

0.02

𝜇

100.82

4.29

3.78

0.39

0.16

0.01

𝛾'

100.05

6.26

99.89

40.1

100.01

159.42

𝛾2

0.58

0.02

0.38

0.02

12.90

1.13

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎_

6.39

0.00

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎/

8.49

0.07

Class size

0.49

Log likelihood

-424730

0.47
AIC

849498

0.03
BIC

849671

We use a latent class approach to model the individual heterogeneity in the utility function.
We start from a one-class model and keep increasing the number of classes. We find the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) stops increasing when the number of classes reaches three.
Furthermore, the size of the third class becomes very small (only about 3%). Therefore, we choose
the three-class specification as our main results. For comparison Table 2.4 reports the estimation
results from one- to three-class specifications, but we will focus our discussion on the three-class
model.
Based on the plan choice and consumption behavior of the three segments implied from
the estimation results, we name these three consumer segments as self-controllers, powerless
habitual readers, and enthusiastic readers.
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There are two large latent segments, 1 and 2, that are similar in size (49% and 47%,
respectively), and another very small segment 3 (3%). 33 The plan choice and consumption
behaviors are significantly different among the three segments. The coefficient 𝛼1 for segment 3
is the largest, indicating consumers of this segment have the highest reading preference. The
coefficient 𝛼1A for all three segments is positive, implying the habit stock will enhance consumers’
marginal utility for consumption. The magnitude is also the highest for segment 3.
The price coefficient 𝜇 is positively significant for all three segments; however, segment 1
is much more price-sensitive than the other two segments. This implies that the reading amount of
consumers in this segment will decrease much more than that of the other two segments when
facing a plan with a high marginal cost (e.g., pay-per-chapter). Note that 𝜇 represents the price
sensitivity during consumption, which can be lower than that in the pricing plan choice stage. The
difference—if it exists—will be captured in a reduced-form way by 𝛾' and 𝛾2 . The larger the
difference in the price sensitivity across different habit stock levels, the higher the value of 𝛾' and
𝛾2 . In Table 2.4, the large estimated 𝛾' across all three segments suggests that the true monetary
or non-monetary cost of reading web fictions has been seriously under-evaluated by all consumers
during the consumption stage. Worse still, the positive estimated 𝛾2 suggests that as the habit stock
increases, the cost will be under-evaluated even more. Therefore, consumers during the pricing
plan choice stage have an incentive to self-control their future consumption.
How can they control the consumption level? Obviously choosing the pay-per-chapter plan
is a feasible option, yet this option works differently across consumers. For consumers of segment
1, because of their high price sensitivity, the reading amount will significantly drop if they switch

33

The percentages reported are rounded up to the nearest percentage point.
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from the monthly subscription to the pay-per-chapter plan. For consumers of the other two
segments, however, their much smaller price sensitivities imply that their reading amount will not
change much after the switch. As an illustration, we assume that for every consumer, the habit
stock is at zero level, and calculate the predicted reading amount of each segment. The average
monthly reading amount of a consumer in segment 1 is 173.2 chapters, with a 53% probability of
no reading, under the monthly subscription plan. This drops to 133.5 chapters per month, with a
59% probability of no reading, under the pay-per-chapter plan. In contrast, for a consumer of
segment 2, the reading amount under monthly subscription is 175.7 chapters per month, with a
52.5% probability of no reading. Switching to the pay-per-chapter plan will only marginally reduce
the reading amount.
The difference in how much reading amount can be reduced will have the main impact on
the pricing plan choice. We find that the probability of choosing the pay-per-chapter plan is close
to 100% among consumers of segment 1. The reading amount is 631 chapters under the monthly
subscription and 435 chapters under the pay-per-chapter plan, across consumers under different
levels of habit stock in our data. With the 0.1 RMB/chapter price under pay-per-chapter, an average
consumer in segment 1 pays 43.5 RMB for his/her monthly reading, while the monthly
subscription would cost them 12 RMB. This suggests that an average consumer in segment 1 is
willing to pay 31.5 RMB (about 4.6 U.S. dollars) more to reduce their monthly reading amount by
196 chapters. Assuming it takes five minutes to read one chapter, our results imply that consumers
of this segment are willing to pay about a little more than four dollars per month to cut their time
on web fiction by about 16 hours per month (or about half an hour per day). In contrast, the
probability of choosing the pay-per-chapter plan among consumers of segment 2 gradually drops
from 55% to 29%, as the habit stock increases from 0 to 2,000 (this is the range among the majority
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of consumers estimated from the model), indicating a much weaker willingness to conduct selfcontrol. Given that these consumers are incapable of controlling the reading amount, we find that
assuming their habit stock starts from zero, it will increase rapidly each month and eventually
stabilize at a level much higher than that of consumers in segment 1. Consequently, their
consumption level will also stabilize at a much higher level.
Because of the differences in consumption behaviors and pricing plan choices—and the
subsequent changes in the habit stock—between the two segments, we call consumers of segment
1 self-controllers and consumers of segment 2 powerless habitual readers. Due to their large size,
these two segments are the most important consumers from the platform’s profit perspective.
To conclude, our estimation results demonstrate that a high cost is associated with reading
books, which consumers in the consumption stage do not consider. This leads to the time
inconsistency problem that incentivizes consumers to use self-control strategies when they make
the plan choice. We find that about half the number of consumers are self-controllers. They choose
pay-per-chapter, and most of them overpay. The reason is that this segment is price-sensitive
during consumption; therefore, paying for each chapter as a self-control strategy would be
effective in curbing future consumption. Consequently, price-sensitive consumers are more likely
to overpay. This result is counterintuitive because previous economic and marketing studies have
found that, all else being equal, price-sensitive consumers will engage in more cost-saving
purchase and consumption strategies (e.g., taking advantage of price promotions, searching more
for price information). However, we show that when strategic self-control is an important goal in
the purchase decision, the result can reverse.
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2.5.2 Model Fit and Alternative Model Specifications
To investigate the model fit, we simulate the plan choice and reading amount for each individual
in the data for six time periods, using the estimation results from the proposed model. We repeat
the simulation process with 50 different draws from the stationary distribution.
The upper panel of Figure 2.3 illustrates that the simulated average reading amount for all
readers is 512.1 chapters per month, whereas it is 506.4 chapters in the actual data. The lower
panel shows that the average probability of choosing pay-per-chapter in the simulation is 73.38%
across six months, whereas it is 74.51% in the data. These comparisons indicate that our model
predictions fit the actual data pattern very well.
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Figure 2.3: Model Fit: reading and plan choice

Our model can also replicate the unique overpaying data patterns we discussed in section
2.2. Figure 2.4 compares the overpaying probability under each pricing plan predicted by the
model and the actual data. Our model predicts that around 6.4% of consumers overpay under
monthly subscription by reading less than 120 chapters, and 45.8% consumers overpay under the
pay-per-chapter plan by reading more than 120 chapters. In the data, the overpaying proportions
are 6.6% under the monthly subscription and 34.2% under pay-per-chapter. Our model replicates
the asymmetrical overpay pattern.

90

100%
80%

Overpay with pay-per-chapter

Overpay with monthly subscription

60%
40%
20%
0%

Data

Our model

Figure 2.4 Model Fit: overpaying ratio

For comparison purpose, we estimate two alternative models. The first assumes timeconsistent agents, that is, the consumers’ reading amount choice during the consumption stage is
consistent with the choice during the pricing plan choice stage. This is similar to the empirical
implementation of the rational addiction theory proposed in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy
(1994). The second one is a model with naive time-inconsistent consumers, that is, during the
pricing plan choice stage, they assume their choice during the consumption stage does not deviate
(but indeed it does). Estimation results for time-consistent consumers and naive time-inconsistent
consumers are reported in Appendix B (Table B1 and Table B2).
We first look at the predictions from the rational model with time-consistent consumers.
This model shows worse performance in terms of likelihood and Akaike information criterion /BIC
compared to our main estimation results. The parameters and the estimation procedure are the
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same except that there are no time-inconsistent parameters (𝛾' , 𝛾2 in our full model). The estimation
also gives us three consumer segments. However, this time 94% of the total population has a very
low price coefficient of 0.34 in consumer segment 1, while the other two segments with higher
price sensitivities only account for 3% of the consumers. Such results are significantly different
from our main estimation results where almost half of the consumers have relatively high price
sensitivity and thus willing to conduct self-control. Without time-inconsistent preference, there is
no incentive for consumers to choose the costlier pricing plan to curb future consumption.
Essentially, these estimation results attribute the reason why consumers overpay for their reading
to very low price sensitivity, which cannot explain the asymmetry in overpaying pattern presented
in the previous section. With 94% consumers caring very little about the monetary cost, this model
predicts that the average choice probability of the monthly subscription plan is 62.5%, far higher
than 25.5% in the data. The model also predicts the average monthly reading amount to be 743
chapters, well beyond the 506.4 chapters in data. Finally, the predicted proportions of overpaying
under the pay-per-chapter plan and monthly subscriptions are 23% and 16%, respectively. It fails
to replicate the high overpaying ratio for the pay-per-chapter plan. These results show that, without
accounting for the time-inconsistent preferences, a standard rational economic model cannot
explain the unique behavioral patterns we observe from data.
For the model with naive consumers, we find that the three-class model has a slightly higher
log-likelihood value or lower BIC in comparison with the proposed model. Although the model fit
is better, we believe that this is unlikely to be the true model that explains the unique behavioral
patterns in data. For example, estimation results show a large consumer segment similar to the
self-controllers in our proposed model. Using simulations, we find that consumers of this segment
when making the pricing plan choice expect to read 220 chapters in each month; however, in
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reality, they consistently read more than 800 chapters. Such under-prediction bias also exists for
the other two segments. Overall, the model attributes the overpaying pattern to the fact that more
than 60% consumers systematically underestimate their monthly reading amount by 300 to 800
chapters a month. Given the consistently high consumption level across individuals, and the ease
of tracking the reading history, such a considerable underestimation persisting over many months
is unlikely to happen in our data.
We further test the robustness of the estimation results under other model specifications.
We vary the value of 𝛿, the depreciation rate in the habit formation, from 0.1 to 0.9 and re-estimate
the proposed model. Though other parameters and model implications remain the same, we find
that the lower the value of 𝛿, the larger is the estimated value of 𝛼1A . However, the multiplication
𝛿 ∙ 𝛼1A remains stable. We also test different values for the time discounting factor 𝛽, and extend
the range of the state space to [0, 10,000], which covers 99.9% of the data. All the results are
similar to the results reported in Table 2.4.

2.5.3 Counterfactuals
To illustrate the substantive implications of our study, we investigate four counterfactual scenarios.
The first two scenarios restrict the pricing plans that consumers can choose, and the last two
scenarios increase consumers’ options by separately introducing a nonlinear pricing plan with
volume discount and another with volume surcharge. We use random draws from the stationary
distribution calculated from our estimation result as the initial consumption stock state. In each
scenario, we simulate the plan and reading choices of consumers from each segment, until the
reading distribution becomes stable after the policy change.34 We then compare the difference in

34

We simulate the data for 12 periods under all scenarios and use the last six months for comparison. We find that
the reading-amount distribution typically stabilizes after 2 to 4 months.
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the monthly average reading amount, consumer welfare, and the platform’s profit (measured by
the revenue). It is straightforward to measure the change in reading amount and revenue under new
pricing policies. To measure consumer welfare, we follow the “dictator of the present” method
(see Cropper and Laibson, 1998; Caplin and Leahy, 2000; Gruber and Köszegi, 2001). We measure
a consumer’s welfare as the discounted value of his life-time utility flow under the model
equilibrium. Given that a unique stationary distribution exists in our model, we randomly draw the
initial state from the stationary distribution for each consumer segment 50 times and calculate the
average of the value functions. To compute the change in overall consumer welfare across different
consumer segments, we calculate the weighted average of the percentage change for each
consumer segments.
Table 2.5 Counterfactual Results

Monthly Subscription Only

Self-controller

Powerless
habitual
reader

Enthusiastic
reader

Overall

Reading amount

44.41%

0.51%

0.00%

16.82%

Firm revenue

-79.52%

-71.91%

-85.77%

-76.95%

Consumer welfare

-76.06%

-6.96%

-0.01%

-40.54%

Self-controller

Powerless
habitual
reader

Enthusiastic
reader

Overall

Reading amount

0.00%

-0.69%

0.00%

-0.38%

Firm revenue

0.00%

102.87%

96.82%

46.35%

Consumer welfare

0.15%

-9.74%

-0.01%

-4.51%

Pay-per-chapter only (Linear Pricing)
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Pay-per-chapter only (Volume Discount)

Self-controller

Powerless
habitual
reader

Enthusiastic
reader

Overall

Reading amount

9.02%

-0.42%

0.00%

3.13%

Firm revenue

6.51%

95.79%

70.74%

45.48%

-26.14%

-10.05%

-0.01%

-17.54%

Self-controller

Powerless
habitual
reader

Enthusiastic
reader

Overall

Reading amount

-7.48%

-0.94%

0.00%

-3.30%

Firm revenue

-6.98%

109.84%

108.68%

46.02%

Consumer welfare

14.47%

-9.81%

-0.01%

2.48%

Consumer welfare

Pay-per-chapter only (Volume Surcharge)

The first counterfactual restricts consumers’ option to monthly subscription only. This
scenario is reminiscent of the practice of Netflix, which only offers the monthly subscription plan
for watching movies. Consumers choose whether to subscribe or not. The results are in the first
panel of Table 2.5. As expected, the reading amount of self-controllers will increase by 44.41%
(from 441 chapters to 637 chapters) per month, when they do not have the option of choosing the
pay-per-chapter plan to curb consumption. Across all three segments, the reading amount increases
by 16.82%. Without the pay-per-chapter plan, the welfare of self-controllers decreases by 76.06%.
The platform’s profit from this segment also drops by 79.52%. Overall, the consumer welfare
drops by 40.54% and the platform’s profit drop by 76.95%. The reason that higher reading amounts
generate much less profit for the platform is that consumers who used to read around 600 to 700
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chapters a month and still pay by chapters now have to switch to the monthly subscription. As a
result, the average revenue per consumer drops from 60~70 RMB to 12 RMB per month.
In the second counterfactual, the platform only offers the pay-per-chapter plan. This
scenario mimics the video game market, in which players have to pay for each game title. The
second panel of Table 2.5 reports the results. Because almost all self-controllers choose pay-perchapter, the policy change has a very limited effect on them. Powerless habitual readers and
enthusiastic readers are more affected. Given that the consumers of these two segments are less
price-sensitive, they will continue to maintain the high consumption under the pay-per-chapter
plan, and therefore, will pay significantly more to the platform. Consequently, the consumer
welfare of powerless habitual readers will decrease by 9.74%.35 Overall, consumer welfare will
reduce by 4.51%. The profit of the platform will significantly increase by 46.35%, mostly from
the powerless habitual readers.
The above two counterfactuals suggest that taking away options from consumers will result
in a decrease in consumer welfare. We further investigate if there exists a pricing policy that could
improve both the platform’s profit and consumers’ well-being. In the next two counterfactuals, we
introduce a step-wise pay-per-chapter pricing structure, where the price is a nonlinear function of
the reading amount. In the third counterfactual, we introduce a novel volume discount plan with a
nonlinear structure. Under this plan, consumers pay 0.12 RMB for the first 400 chapters every
month, after which the price decreases by 0.04 RMB. The 400-chapter threshold is chosen based
on the median reading amount under the pay-per-chapter scenario. As the pay-per-chapter plan
charges 0.1 RMB, the new plan is more expensive if a consumer reads below 400 chapters. The

35

For enthusiastic readers, they are very price insensitive and have a high reading preference, hence, their welfare is
not much affected.
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third panel of Table 2.5 reports the results. Offering the additional pricing plan, the platform’s
profit will decrease by 45.48%. This is because consumers can switch from the pay-per-chapter
plan to the volume discount plan and pay less for reading. Though consumers pay less, consumer
welfare will reduce by 17.54%. This is due to the higher non-monetary cost as they consume more.
Finally, we introduce a novel volume surcharge plan. Under this plan, consumers are
charged 0.08 RMB for the first 400 chapters they read and 0.12 RMB afterwards. Such a pricing
scheme is similar to the anti-addiction law for minors playing video games in China, wherein the
reward from the game (such as virtual coins) decrease or are forfeited by the system when a player
spends a certain amount of time playing video games. If the player keeps playing, he/she will be
forced to quit the game for a certain period (usually 24 hours) before being allowed to log back
into the game. Under such a pricing scheme, our results are reported in the bottom panel of Table
2.5. With this additional pricing plan, self-controllers’ welfare will increase by 14.47%, as many
of these consumers will switch from the pay-per-chapter plan to the new plan, and thus, reduce
their reading amount by 7.48%. The welfare of powerless habitual readers, on the other hand, will
decrease because they pay more for reading (though their reading amount will marginally reduce).
Overall, the aggregate consumer welfare will increase by 2.48%, while the platform’s profit also
increases by 46.02%. This profit increase is only 0.33% less than the profit increase generated
when the platform only offers a pay-per-chapter plan in the second counterfactual.
The findings from the four counterfactuals are astonishing. Taking away the monthly
subscription option in the second counterfactual implies the platform forces consumers to restrict
their consumption. Our results show that consumers who would have chosen monthly subscription
will still read a lot, and thus, overpay under the pay-per-chapter plan. Therefore, choosing a pricing
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strategy that helps prevent consumption in this empirical setting can benefit the platform. A pricing
plan with volume surcharge, which will restrict consumers’ overall consumption, can
simultaneously improve the platform’s profit and consumer welfare. By charging a higher price
when reading above a certain level, the plan helps self-controllers to further control their
consumption and also generate more revenue for the platform from powerless habitual readers,
who already have a strong habit of reading web fictions. In contrast, pricing strategies that
encourage more consumption, such as offering the monthly subscription only, will hurt not only
the consumer welfare but also the platform’s profit. The managerial implications will be
completely the opposite if one does not take time-inconsistent preferences and consumers’
strategic self-control into account. This highlights the substantive contribution of our study.

2.6 Conclusion
In this study, we examine how consumers overpay for reading web fiction as a means of strategic
self-control when time-inconsistent preferences exist during consumption. Using data from one of
China’s largest digital book platforms, we find a large percentage of consumers consistently
choose pay-per-chapter even when the monthly subscription plan would be less costly. To explain
this behavior, we construct a dynamic structural model featuring habit formation and timeinconsistent preferences and demonstrate that choosing a costlier pricing plan to curb consumption
can be optimal for consumers. We apply our model to the data. Estimation results suggest that the
market has three segments of consumers. Self-controllers overpay for the pay-per-chapter plan
because the high cost of reading can effectively work as a “commitment device” to restrict future
consumption. In the counterfactuals, we show that eliminating the pay-per-chapter plan would hurt
consumer welfare and the platform’s profit. Eliminating the monthly subscription plan, however,
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would increase the platform’s profit but reduce consumer welfare. We introduce a novel nonlinear
pricing plan with volume surcharge and show how it can simultaneously improve the platform’s
profit and consumer welfare.
Our study contributes both theoretically and empirically to the literature on consumer timeinconsistent preferences and strategic self-control behaviors. Findings from our structural model
help shed light on firms’ pricing strategies in the digital content market. Despite its contributions,
this research has limitations that call for future study. First, the lack of price variation in our data
limits our ability to investigate the optimal prices the platform should charge for various pricing
plans. Second, due to the lack of data, our study abstracts away from platform competition, which
may bias our counterfactual results. For example, if removing the monthly subscription would
push heavy readers to switch to another competing platform, the increase in the focal platform’s
profit would be more limited. Finally, we acknowledge that strategic self-control may not be the
only mechanism that can explain the overpaying behavior. One can use surveys to test what is the
underlying mechanism that drives the observed consumer behaviors.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Additional Proofs for Chapter 2
A1. Proof of Proposition 1 in Chapter 2
In this section, we provide the detailed proof of proposition 1, showing the analytical solution to
our baseline model. Before we start the formal proof, we first restate the problems to be solved:
𝑉(ℎ) = max 𝑢> (𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) − 𝜇𝑝( 1{𝑠 = 1} + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ$ )

[1]

𝑢> (𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) = (𝛼1 + 𝛼1A ℎ)𝑐 − 𝛼11 𝑐 & − 𝜇𝑝1 1{𝑠 = 0}𝑐 − 𝛾𝑐

[2]

ℎ$ = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ + 𝑐

[3]

(

𝑐 ∗ (𝑠, ℎ) ≡

𝛼1 + 𝛼1A ℎ − 𝜇𝑝1 1{𝑠 = 0}
𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ∗ ≥ 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
2𝛼11

[4]

where equation 4 is easily derived from the maximization of the utility function in equation 2 in
terms of consumption c. 36 For notation simplicity, let 𝑢( (ℎ) ≡ 𝑢> (𝑐 ∗ (𝑠, ℎ), 𝑠, ℎ) − 𝜇𝑝( 1{𝑠 = 1},
we can rewrite the problems above as:
𝑉(ℎ) = max{𝑉' (ℎ), 𝑉2 (ℎ)}
(

[5]

𝑉' (ℎ) = 𝑢' (ℎ) + 𝛽 ∗ max {𝑉' (ℎ' ), 𝑉2 (ℎ' )}
𝑉2 (ℎ) = 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽 ∗ max{𝑉' (ℎ2 ), 𝑉2 (ℎ2 )}.

36

It is straightforward to see that if 𝑠 = 1, 𝑐 ∗ > 0; if s=0, then if 𝑐 ∗ =0 at time t, all consumers’ future decisions will
be reduced to the trivial equilibrium where s=0 and 𝑐 ∗ =0 for all future periods. So we focus on the case where 𝑐 ∗ >
0
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𝑎1A
𝑎1 − 𝜇𝑝1
Gℎ +
2𝑎11
2𝑎11
𝑎
𝑎1
1A
ℎ2 = A(1 − 𝛿 ) +
Gℎ +
.
2𝑎11
2𝑎11

ℎ' = A(1 − 𝛿 ) +

[6]

Where 𝑉' (ℎ)/𝑉2 (ℎ) and ℎ' /ℎ2 represent the value function and the next-period consumption stock
when the consumer chooses s=0/s=1 for the current period.
Notice that for a given plan choice s, the value function V is continuous in terms of the state
variable h. Given the state space is a compact set (a closed interval on ℛ2 ), the contraction mapping
theorem holds and there exists a unique fixed point for value function V for any h.
From equation 6, we can solve for two candidate steady states:
ℎ2(( =

𝛼1 − 𝜇𝑝1
𝛼1
, ℎ&(( =
.
2𝛿𝛼11 − 𝑎1A
2𝛿𝛼11 − 𝛼1A

Because consumption is nonnegative, h is also nonnegative. So we further impose an additional
assumption.
Assumption I
2𝛿𝛼11 − 𝛼1A > 0

[7]

Assumption I guarantees at least one of the steady states is positive. This assumption also give us
an ideal property of the model: The “slope” in the linear equation 6 is strictly less than 1 under
assumption I, which ensures both steady states as convergent steady state for the model. Before
we prove the existence of the equilibria, we first consider a simple case in which the consumers
always choose s=1 or s=0. Denote the value under these scenarios as 𝑊( (ℎ), we have
𝑊' (ℎ) = 𝑢' (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊' (ℎ' )
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𝑊2 (ℎ) = 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊2 (ℎ2 ).

[8]

Because 𝑢( (ℎ) is a quadratic form in h and equation 6 is linear in h, we know W must also be
quadratic functions of h. Plugging equation 2 and 6 into equation 8, we can solve for the 𝑊( (ℎ).
Assume
𝑊' (ℎ) = 𝑎' ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐'

[9]

𝑊2 (ℎ) = 𝑎2 ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2 .
To keep the notation from being overcomplicated, we introduce a new set of utility parameter
notations such that

𝑢' (ℎ) = 𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵' ℎ + 𝐶'

[10]

𝑢2 (ℎ) = 𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵2 ℎ + 𝐶2
ℎ' = 𝑒ℎ + 𝑓'
ℎ2 = 𝑒ℎ + 𝑓2 .
Now, we can use equation 8 to solve for the parameters in equation 9 in terms of these simplified
notations for utility parameters:
𝑎' ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' = 𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵' ℎ + 𝐶' + 𝛽[𝑎' (𝑒ℎ + 𝑓' )& + 𝑏' (𝑒ℎ + 𝑓' ) + 𝑐' ], ∀ℎ.
We get
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⎧
⎪

K

𝑎' = 2:L/ 2
𝑏' =

M$ 3&L/0$ -$
2:L/

⎨
⎪𝑐 = *$ 3L-$ 0$2 3L+$ 0$
⎩ '
2:L

.

Similarly, we can solve for 𝑊2 (ℎ) in the same way and get

⎧
⎪

K

𝑎2 = 2:L/ 2
𝑏2 =

M% 3&L/0% -%
2:L/

⎨
⎪𝑐 = *% 3L-% 0%2 3L+% 0%
⎩ 2
2:L

,

where

𝐴=

&
𝛼1A
𝛼1A
; 𝑒 = (1 − 𝛿) +
;
4𝛼11
2𝛼11

𝐵' =

(%0 :D>0 :I)b01

𝐵2 =

(%0 :I)%01

&%00

&%00

; 𝐶' =

; 𝐶2 =

(%0 :D>0 )(%0 :D>0 :&I)

%0 (%0 :&I)
G%00

G%00

; 𝑓' =

%0 :D>0
&%00

;

%

− 𝜇𝑝( ; 𝑓2 = &%0 .
00

Notice 𝑎2 = 𝑎' , so 𝑊2 (ℎ) − 𝑊' (ℎ) = (𝑏2 − 𝑏' )ℎ − (𝑐' − 𝑐2 ) , which is linear in h and thus
guarantees the “single-crossing” property of 𝑊2 (ℎ) and 𝑊' (ℎ). Equipped with these results, we
start the formal proof of proposition 1. Our method is by guess and verify of the value function
and then solve for the policy function.
∗
𝒔𝒔
1. When 𝒉𝒔𝒔
𝟐 > 𝒉𝟏 > 𝒉𝟏

𝑉=›

𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' , ℎ < ℎ2∗
𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2 , ℎ ≥ ℎ2∗
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ℎ2∗ =

𝑐' − 𝑐2
.
𝑏2 − 𝑏'

Without loss of generosity, assume the consumer starts with some initial consumption stock state
ℎ > ℎ2∗ . If the above value function is correct, after one iteration, V will remain identical. In other
words, because ℎ > ℎ2∗ , we need to show that for any h after the consumer makes the optimal planchoice decision to maximize the value function, V will still be equal to 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2 after it is
plugged into equation 5. Given assumption I, we know that if the consumer chooses monthly
subscription s=1, ℎ2∗ is lower than her next-period consumption stock state, ℎ2 . However, it is
undetermined whether ℎ' > ℎ2∗ . So, we discuss two cases here.
Case I ℎ' < ℎ2∗
𝑉(ℎ) = max (𝑉' (ℎ), 𝑉2 (ℎ))
&

= max Æ𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵' ℎ + 𝐶' + 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ' + 𝑏' ℎ' + 𝑐' k , 𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵2 ℎ + 𝐶2
&

+ 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ2 + 𝑏2 ℎ2 + 𝑐2 kÇ
= max{𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' , 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2 }
= 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2,
where the second equation utilizes the “fixed-point” property of 𝑊2 and 𝑊& , and the third equation
is simply algebra with the fact the 𝑏2 > 𝑏' and 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2 > 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' with any ℎ >
ℎ2∗ = (𝑐' − 𝑐2 )/(𝑏2 − 𝑏' ).
Case II ℎ' ≥ ℎ2∗
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&

𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵' ℎ + 𝐶' + 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ' + 𝑏2 ℎ' + 𝑐2 k ,
𝑉(ℎ) = max ²
È
&
𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵2 ℎ + 𝐶2 + 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ2 + 𝑏2 ℎ2 + 𝑐2 k
𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' + 𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )ℎ' + (𝑐2 − 𝑐' )],
= max ›
Ÿ
𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2
= max { 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' + 𝛽 [(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )ℎ' + (𝑐2 − 𝑐' )],
𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' + [(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )ℎ + (𝑐2 − 𝑐' )]}.
Because ℎ > ℎ2∗ > ℎ2(( , by equation 6, we know that ℎ > ℎ' so we have
[(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )ℎ + (𝑐2 − 𝑐' )] > 𝛽 [(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )ℎ + (𝑐2 − 𝑐' )]
and

> 𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )ℎ' + (𝑐2 − 𝑐' )],

𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2 ℎ + 𝑐2 .

Similarly, we can prove that for any ℎ < ℎ2∗ , 𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' .
Given the functional form of the value function, it is straightforward to solve for the optimal policy
function 𝑠(ℎ) = 1 ∗ 1(ℎ > ℎ2∗ ) + 0 ∗ 1(ℎ < ℎ2∗ ).
𝒔𝒔
2. When 𝒉∗𝟏 >𝒉𝒔𝒔
𝟐 >𝒉𝟏 ,
f1

r 𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 f1 32 (𝑎' ℎ&f1 32 + 𝑏' ℎ f1 32 + 𝑐' ) 𝑖𝑓 ℎ ≥ ℎ&∗
𝑉(ℎ) = É
,
@6'

𝑎' ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐'

𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

where
ℎ' = ℎ
ℎ@32 = 𝑒ℎ@ + 𝑓2 ; 𝑡 = 0,1,2, … , 𝑇A
(1 − e)h∗& − f2
log (
1 − e)h − f2
𝑇A = ë
û
log e
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ℎ&∗ =

(𝑐' − 𝑐2 ) + 𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )𝑓2 + 𝑐2 − 𝑐' ]
.
(1 − 𝛽𝑒)(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )

Proof:
First, we define the “difference function” Z(h) as

𝑍(ℎ) ≡ 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊' (ℎ2 ) − 𝑊' (ℎ) = 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊' (𝑒ℎ + 𝑓2 ) − 𝑊' (ℎ).

Z(h) measures the lifetime utility difference between when consumers always choose
pay-per-chapter and when consumers purchase monthly subscription in the current period
and choose to pay-per-chapter starting next period. When Z(h)=0, the consumer receives
same utility value no matter what price plan he chooses in the next time period, given that
he keep pay-per-chapter since the third time period. With some algebra, we can show
𝑍(ℎ) = (𝐵2 + 𝛽(2𝑎𝑒𝑓2 + 𝑏' 𝑒) − 𝑏' )ℎ + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑐' − 𝑐2 ) + 𝛽(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )𝑓2
= (𝐵2 − 𝐵' + 𝛽_2𝑎𝑒(𝑓2 − 𝑓' )`ℎ + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑐' − 𝑐2 ) + 𝛽(𝑏2 − 𝑏' )𝑓2 ,
where the second equation uses the fixed-point property of 𝑊' (ℎ). Because 𝐵2 > 𝐵' and
𝑓2 > 𝑓' (the utility for monetary cost is always negative), Z(h) is a linear monotone
increasing function in h, and ℎ&∗ is the unique solution to Z(h)=0. So,
𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤' (ℎ2 ) ≥ 𝑤' (ℎ) ∀ℎ ≥ ℎ&∗
𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤' (ℎ2 ) < 𝑤' (ℎ) ∀ℎ < ℎ&∗ ,
and vice versa.
Next, we show that if ℎ2∗ >ℎ&(( , then ℎ&∗ >ℎ&(( ;
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[11]
[12]

(1 − 𝛽)(𝑐' − 𝑐2 )
+ 𝛽𝑓2
𝑏2 − 𝑏'
∗
ℎ& =
1 − 𝛽𝑒
(1 − 𝛽)ℎ2∗ + 𝛽𝑓2
=
1 − 𝛽𝑒
(1 − 𝛽)ℎ&(( + 𝛽𝑓2
>
1 − 𝛽𝑒
(1 − 𝛽)𝑓2
+ 𝛽𝑓2
= 1−𝑒
1 − 𝛽𝑒
=

𝑓2
= ℎ&(( ,
1−𝑒

where the third equation is derived from the expression of ℎ&(( in the form of 𝑓2 and e.
Finally, we show the value function above is the fixed point of equation 5. Without
loss of generosity, assume some consumer with initial consumption stock state ℎ > ℎ&∗ at
the initial period t=0. We first show by induction that for any T (for any h), when the
consumer starts with any consumption stock state ℎ ≥ ℎ&∗ , the optimal plan choice is
always s=1.
by equation 11, we know that for 𝑇A =0,
𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽(𝑎' ℎ&& + 𝑏' ℎ& + 𝑐' ) = 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤' (ℎ2 ) ≥ 𝑤' (ℎ) = 𝑎' ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐'.
If for 𝑇A = 𝑛, the following inequality holds:
T

r 𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 T32 𝑤' (ℎT32 ) ≥ 𝑤' (ℎ2 ).
@6'

Then, for 𝑇A = 𝑛 + 1, the following also holds:
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T32

r 𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 T3& 𝑤' (ℎT3& )
@6'
T

= r 𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 T32 𝑢2 (ℎT32 ) + 𝛽 T3& 𝑤' (ℎT3& )
@6'
T

= r 𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 T32 _𝑢2 (ℎT32 ) + 𝛽𝑤' (ℎT3& )`
@6'
T

≥ r 𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 T32 𝑤' (ℎT32 )
@6'

≥ 𝑤' (ℎ).
The proof above establishes that when the consumer starts with any consumption stock state ℎ ≥
ℎ&∗ , the optimal decision is always to choose s=1 at the current period . We now show that after
one iteration, the value function remains the same functional form. Because the next-period
consumption stock states will be ℎ2 under s=1, again we discuss two cases in which ℎ2 ≥ ℎ&∗ and
ℎ2 < ℎ&∗ :
Case I. ℎ2 ≥ ℎ&∗
𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ2 )
f 1%

= 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽(r 𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@32 ) + 𝛽 f1% 32 (𝑎' ℎ&f
@6'

1%

Because ℎ2 = 𝑒ℎ + 𝑓2 , 𝑇A% = 𝑇A − 1,
f

1
= ∑@6'
𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 f1 32 _𝑎' ℎ&f1 32 + 𝑏' ℎ f1 32 + 𝑐' `.
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3&

+ 𝑏' ℎ f1% 3& + 𝑐' )

Case II. ℎ2 < ℎ&∗
When ℎ$$ < ℎ&∗ , it is straightforward to see for any time period we have
𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ2 )
&

= 𝑢2 (ℎ) + 𝛽(𝑎' ℎ2 + 𝑏' ℎ2 + 𝑐' )
f

1
= ∑@6'
𝛽 @ 𝑢2 (ℎ@ ) + 𝛽 f1 32 _𝑎' ℎ&f1 32 + 𝑏' ℎ f1 32 + 𝑐' `.

The above case confirms that under either case, the value function always remains the same
functional form. Use equation 12 instead of equation 11, we can repeat the same proof above and
show for any ℎ < ℎ&∗ , 𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑎' ℎ& + 𝑏' ℎ + 𝑐' .
Thus, we have proved that for any h when ℎ2∗ >ℎ&(( >ℎ2(( , the policy function is
𝑠(ℎ) = 1 ∗ (ℎ > ℎ&∗ ) + 0 ∗ (ℎ < ℎ&∗ ).
Symmetrically, when ℎ&(( >ℎ2(( >ℎ2(( , we can show 𝑠(ℎ) = 1 ∗ (ℎ > ℎ&∗∗ ) + 0 ∗ (ℎ < ℎ&∗∗ ), where
ℎ&∗∗ is the unique solution to
𝑢' (ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤2 (ℎ' ) − 𝑤2 (ℎ) = 0.
Solving the equation above gives us ℎ&∗∗ =

(2:L)(1% :1$ )3L(+% :+$ )0$
(2:L/)(+% :+$ )

. Q.E.D.

A2. Proof of Proposition 2 in Chapter 2
Because it is obvious that all states for h are aperiodic given 𝑝S,S , (𝜃) > 0 for any m. To prove
the existence of the limiting distribution, we only need to show that all states for h are irreducible,
T

which means for any state 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, , … , 𝐻, ∃ 𝑛' s.t. 𝑝!"$ > 0 . Together with aperiodic and
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irreducible states, the Markov chain for h is ergodic. Thus, the ergodicity theorem guarantees the
existence of the limiting distribution for h specified in proposition 2.
2
For any i, we first show that if 𝑗 ≥ 𝑖, then ∃ 𝑛' = 1 s.t. 𝑝!"
>0: without loss of generosity, we start
!:2

from any h in state i, which means ℎ ∈ Í

7

!

𝐻, 7 𝐻k. The c.d.f. for the next period ofconsumption

stock state ℎ′ follows the c.d.f 𝑓(ℎ$ |ℎ, 𝜃), which is specified in the main text right before the
proposition 2. Because the consumption is nonnegative, it is straightforward to see that
𝑓(ℎ$ |ℎ, 𝜃)>0 on the support of [(1 − 𝛿)ℎ, 𝐻]. Also, we have
!:%

"

𝐻>
7

":2
7

𝐻 > ℎ > (1 − 𝛿)ℎ, so

Q

2
𝑝!"
= ∫! 8 𝑓(ℎ$ |ℎ ∈ 𝑖, 𝜃)𝑑ℎ′ > 0.
8

Q

Similarly, we can show that for any j that
0, for any j that

":2
7

":2
7

2
𝐻 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)ℎ, 𝑝!"
> 0. Because lim (1 − 𝛿)T ℎ =
T→4

T

𝐻 ≥ 0, there always exists a finite 𝑛' so that 𝑝!"$ > 0.
T

Now that we have established that any i, j=1, 2 , … , N, ∃ 𝑛' s.t. 𝑝!"$ > 0 , together with the facts
that the Markov chain is aperiodic, we have proved the {ℎ@ } is an ergodic Markov chain that has a
unique stationary distribution. Q.E.D.
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Appendix B. Additional Estimation Results for Chapter 2
B1. Estimation results (time-consistent consumers)
beta=0.98

3-Class

Observation=68,706
Segment 1

s.e.

Segment 2

s.e.

Segment 3

s.e.

ah

-113.41

0.41

-25.16

0.84

760.39

31.25

ahi

0.34

37.56

557.86

0.69

0.63

0.02

µ

0.88

418.03

0.65

623.96

1.52

2.23

logσj

6.38

3.63

logσZ

8.49

0.02

Class
size

0.94

Log
likelihoo
d

0.03

AIC

848697

-439711
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0.03

BIC

848870

B2. Estimation results (Naive time-inconsistent consumers)
beta=0.98

3-Class

Observation=68,706
Segment
1

s.e.

Segment
2

s.e.

Segment 3

s.e.

ah

-37.17

6.61

-32.78

6.25

627.14

31.25

ahi

0.82

0.01

0.79

2.43
E-04

1.47

0.02

µ

160.37

5.49

1.40

0.08

0.07

2.23

γ'

649.33

72.65

20.52

0.30

100.30

31.82

γ2

63.27

57.33

0.09

7.81
E-04

14.30

0.05

logσj

8.54

3.19E02

logσZ

6.39

1.38E04

Class size

0.44

Log
likelihood

-424329

0.41
AIC

848697
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0.15
BIC

848870.44

